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Law and Biology: Toward an Integrated
Model of Human Behavior
Owen D. Jones*

The theory of evolution.., unites all the disciplines concerned with
living beings.
Francois Jacob1

INTRODUCTION

As first year law students unhappily discover, the meaning of "law" is
frustratingly protean, shifting by usage and user. Depending on whom you
ask, law is a system of rules, a body of precedents, a legislative enactment,
a collection of norms, a process by which social goals are pursued, or
some dynamic mixture of these. Law's principal purpose is to define and
protect individual rights, to ensure public order, to resolve disputes, to
redistribute wealth, to dispense justice, to prevent or compensate for
injury, to optimize economic efficiency, or perhaps to do something else.
And yet one thing is irreducibly clear: at its most basic, every legal system
exists to effect some change in human behavior. That is, law is a lever

for moving human behavior.2
The very obviousness of this proposition obscures its significance. The
principal implication is this: law depends on a behavioral model as a lever
depends on a fulcrum. Only a behavioral model, which purports to
explain why people behave as they do, can suggest that if law moves this
way behavior will move that way. This means that the success of every
legal system necessarily depends, in part, on the solidity-that is, the
accuracy and predictive power-of the behavioral model on which it rests.
What is law's behavioral model? Surprisingly, little in legal culture or
tradition has prompted us to dwell on this question explicitly. But we
* Associate Professor of Law, Arizona State University College of Law; B.A. Amherst College; J.D.
Yale Law School. I am grateful for the commentary provided by other participants in this symposium,
for the efforts of the Gruter Institute for Law and Behavioral Research to further the use of evolutionary
perspectives in law, and for frequent exchanges with colleagues at the ASU College of Law. Jacqueline
Ganier provided most capable research assistance. This work, in part, elaborates on several themes I
first explored in Evolutionary Analysis in Law: An Introduction andApplication to Child Abuse, 75 N.C.
L. REV. 1117 (1997).
1. FRANCOIS JACOB, THE LOGIC OF LIFE: A HISTORY OF HEREDITY 13 (1982).
2. At the same time, of course, law is itself a manifestation of human behavior. The important
extent to which biology influences the development of morality and proto-legal institutions, such as
ostracism, are beyond the scope of this work. For more on that topic, see OSTRACIsM: A SOCIAL AND
BIOLOGICAL PHENOMENON (Margaret Gruter & Roger Masters eds., 1986); JAMES Q. WILSON, THE
MORAL SENSE (1993); FRANS DE WAAL, GOOD NATURED: THE ORIGINS OF RIGHT AND WRONG IN
HUMANS AND OTHER ANIMALS (1996).
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should. Because when we do we discover that oftentimes the model
against which we knowingly or unknowingly leverage is quite outdated-and that its increasingly apparent inaccuracy inevitably undermines
law's ability to do well whatever it is we want it to do. True, nothing as
decentralized as law can easily be said to reflect a unified anything, much
less a single, well-defined, and conveniently criticizable behavioral model.
Nonetheless, among the set of things policy-makers frequently take for
granted is this: genes create body, and environment creates mind. It
follows from this often unarticulated proposition that behavior (excluding
that caused by reflexes, chemical imbalances, and the like) is simply what
the mind tells the body to do. This, in turn, suggests that behavior can be
shifted as easily (or at least with equal difficulty) in any direction. To
properly shift behavior, it appears, law need only alter those socio-cultural
influences that lead a mind to direct it.
This behavioral model (sometimes known as the Standard Social
Science Model (SSSM) 3) is tidy, straightforward, and pleasingly symmetrical. But it is certainly incomplete. It is inconsistent with an overpowering body of modem evidence, from numerous scientific disciplines,
demonstrating what many people if truly pressed would probably admit:
behavior is not that simple. Instead, all evidence now points to the same
conclusion: genes and environment inseparably intertwine to create an
indivisible individual that has a body with (rather than and) a brain.
Genes affect body and brain; environment affects body and brain. Neither
genetic substructure nor environment, neither "nature" nor "nurture," has
any meaning, for any organism, except in the presence of the other.4
Together, they influence both morphology and behavior, albeit in
ultimately unknowable admixtures. This means that certain kinds of lawrelevant behaviors are inevitably influenced by evolved, species-typical
behavioral predispositions (by, that is, an evolved human psychology) just
as species-typical body features (such as binocular vision and opposable
thumbs) are necessarily products of the evolutionary processes by which
they emerged. The fact that these widely-shared human predispositions
are both acutely sensitive to small variations in environmental stimuli, as
well as frequently malleable in the presence of human consciousness and
will, does not significantly lessen their relevance.
If law is, as I believe it must be, a consumer of behavioral models, then
it has historically been a passive one-either unaware of or untroubled by
the increasing gap between the model its activities often reflect and the

3.

John Tooby & Leda Cosmides, The Psychological Foundations of Culture, in THE ADAPTED

MIND: EVOLUTIONARY PSYCHOLOGY AND THE GENERATION OF CULTURE 19, 23 (Jerome H. Barkow

et al. eds., 1992) [hereinafter THE ADAPTED MIND].
4.

See generally MATT RIDLEY, THE RED QUEEN: SEX AND THE EVOLUTION OF HUMAN NATURE

55-87 (1994); Paul R. Abramson & Steven D. Pinkerton, Introduction:Nature,Nurture, and In-Between,
in SEXUAL NATURE, SEXUAL CULTURE 1, 1 (Paul R. Abramson & Steven D. Pinkerton eds., 1995)
(arguing that "the nature/nurture debate is antithetical to scientific enquiry").
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best model available. Law's frequent reliance on outdated, incomplete,
and oversimplistic theories of human behavior forces it to forgo opportunities to increase its effectiveness. We should expect more from the legal
system, and the legal system should expect more from its behavioral
model suppliers. In my view, the legal system should be an active
participant in the process by which law-relevant social sciences and life
sciences integrate to describe a more unified, internally consistent
behavioral model-against which law can then more successfully leverage
human behavior in whatever directions appropriate democratic processes
prescribe.
This article is divided into four parts. Part I traces the principal cause
of behavioral model obsolescence to disciplinary specialization and argues
that an explicit emphasis within law on the construction and use of
integrated behavioral models can help to reduce law's vulnerability to such
obsolescence. Part II reviews the predicate stages of one method by which
that emphasis can yield superior behavioral models. It illustrates the main
features of that method with examples regarding child abuse. Part III
builds on Part II to engage the central difficulty of how behavioral models
can be integrated in practice. It shows how, for example, socio-cultural
theories about human behavior toward juveniles and evolutionary theories
about animal behavior toward juveniles, can be combined to yield a more
accurate and more predictive model of child abuse in humans. Part IV
then briefly addresses why such integrative exercises have important
implications for law.
I.

THE OBSOLESCENCE OF UNINTEGRATED BEHAVIORAL MODELS

People specialize because knowledge cumulates-and because our
collective capacity to generate, store, and transmit information increasingly
exceeds any individual's capacity to absorb it. Disciplinary divisions
necessarily follow-both because the people of each successive generation
master a smaller and smaller proportion of accumulated knowledge, and
because there are some efficiency gains from a division of intellectual
labor. But since disciplinary specialization necessarily trades breadth
against depth, deepening knowledge tends to increase disciplinary
isolation. This isolation, in turn, risks a Tower of Babel effect, in which
impediments to the communication of information across individuals and
societies foster waste-both in foregone opportunities for intellectual
advance, and in the well-intentioned but ignorant pursuit in one discipline
of what another has proved obsolete or inaccurate.
That waste is most problematic for disciplines, like law, that critically
depend on the knowledge offered up by other disciplines. Whenever law
relies upon aspects of any discipline that have been effectively obsolesced
by events in yet another discipline, then law's own enterprise becomes
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vulnerable to failure. It is vulnerable in much the same way an effort to
build an efficient engine would be vulnerable if the engine were designed
to operate on anticipated chemical reactions, propounded by chemists, that
violated fundamental laws of physics. Just as engineers need a model that
integrates chemistry with physics, law needs a model that integrates the
social sciences (upon which it currently and heavily relies) with the life
sciences. For these remain largely unintegrated-and to posit a psychological or behavioral concept that is incompatible with evolutionary biology
is as problematic as proposing a chemical reaction that violates the laws
of physics.5
We should, of course, expect that all disciplines strive to create a
"seamless system of interconnected knowledge." 6 That is, we should
expect them to aggressively pursue mutual consistency, which ultimately
demands compatibility of theory and data between relevant fields. But
history shows that expectation to be quirkily parochial. While we expect,
for instance, that chemists and physicists should seek theories that unify
their disciplines, we have cheerfully tolerated the most profound
inconsistencies between the behavioral disciplines relevant to humans.
For example, the standard social science model, upon which much of
our legal system's operations may unwittingly rest, typically grounds its
behavioral theories on the presupposition that human existence can (with
very few exceptions) be neatly divided into mind and body, the mental and
the physical. It certainly appeared thus to our ancestors, since the
uniquely well-developed abilities of our species in consciousness and
thought, as well as the seeming inexplicability of those phenomena,
suggested that our brains were not subject to the same causal processes
that produced the rest of the natural world. Despite its dogged persistence,
however, this generally unexamined assumption is merely a quaint
reflection of the oversimplistic and outdated dualism of early Western
culture, which can still be observed in such artificial constructs of
oppositionality as: nature versus nurture; biological versus cultural;
biological versus social; and animal versus human.
The persistence of such dualism is an epiphenomenon of disciplinary
specialization. To an important number of modern disciplines, however,
the world no longer looks so conveniently binary. Recent advances in
cognitive science, neurobiology, evolutionary biology, behavioral ecology,
psychology, social anthropology, biological anthropology, and
primatology, for instance, have revealed that the human brain is an

5. Leda Cosmides et al., Introduction: Evolutionary Psychology and Conceptual Integration
[hereinafter Evolutionary Psychology and Conceptual Integration],in THE ADAPTED MIND, supra note
3, at 3, 4.
6. Tooby & Cosmides, supra note 3,at 19.
7. See generally Evolutionary Psychology and Conceptual Integration, supra note 5.
8. See Tooby & Cosmides, supra note 3, at 21 (discussing dualism).
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evolved physical structure, like any other in the body, that is inevitably the
product of a general genetic blueprint in the presence of specific
environmental building materials and affective conditions. 9 The brain's
design and operation can be understood in terms of the same fundamental
principles of physics and bio-chenistry to which all other aspects of life
are subject. And this renders the mind/body dualism of the standard social
science model artificial and misleading.'
For while one of the brain's principal purposes is to process highly
complex information, the way it carries out that task is affected by its
neural architecture. And because its neural architecture is geneticallyinfluenced, the brain's processing pathways tend to reflect the cumulated
result of hundreds of millions of years of natural selection. That is, to the
extent that the way a brain processes information affects behavior, and to
the extent that variance in behavior can yield variance in reproductive
success ("RS"), gene combinations disposing a brain to processing patterns
that tend to yield behaviors that increase the RS of an organism over the
RS of its contemporaries tend, in turn, to spread to larger and larger
proportions of each successive population.
Consequently, a great number of scientists from relevant fields now
believe that what we refer to as the human mind must consist, at least in
part, of a set of evolved information-processing mechanisms. Along with
the developmental programs that yield them, they are adaptations produced
by natural selection over evolutionary time in ancestral environments."
These mechanisms are believed to be richly structured in context-specific
ways, and functionally specialized to produce behavior responsive to
particular adaptive problems (such as mate selection, language acquisition,
and the like).12
These evolved mechanisms are powerfully relevant to law, because they
predispose the human mind to process particular kinds of information in
emphatically non-random patterns, which tend in turn to produce nonrandom behavioral patterns observable in human societies.' This means
that law cannot shift human behavior as easily in all directions. For even
though the precise manifestations of these psychological informationprocessing mechanisms differ across populations and cannot be predicted

9. The blueprint must be general because the human brain contains approximately 1015 synapses,
while all the human chromosomes combined contain only about 105 genes. There is, therefore, not
enough genetically coded information in the entire human genome to control every synaptic connection.
TIMOTHY H. GOLDSMITH, THE BIOLOGICAL ROOTS OF HUMAN NATURE: FORGING LINKS BETWEEN
EVOLUTION AND BEHAVIOR 75 (1991).

10. For a concise argument against such duality, see ROGER D. MASTERS, BEYOND RELATIVISM:
SCIENCE AND HUMAN VALUES 134-43 (1993).
11. See, e.g., Tooby & Cosmides, supra note 3, at 24.
12. Id.
13. This process inevitably contributes to (without rigidly dictating) the generation of "culture."
And culture often reciprocally affects the very environments that, in turn, powerfully affect the way
brains and bodies develop, interact with others, and sometimes reproduce.
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for any single individual (given infinitely varying environments, and the
inevitable effects of chance) behavioral patterns that do emerge from large
groups of people will tend to reflect the adaptive logic of the evolutionary
processes by which the human species, with its human mind, emerged."t
Law will encounter resistance that varies according to the strengths of
evolved 1predispositions to those behaviors that law may attempt to
regulate.1
The growing disjunction between the standard social science model,
which does not reflect this understanding of the brain as an evolved
physical structure, and the emerging, synthesized consensus of other
disciplines, which do, therefore yields waste-both within areas of the
research arms of isolated social sciences, and within the disciplines like
law that for historical reasons have relied upon them, almost exclusively,
for guidance on the causes of human behavior. An integrative process
can combat this wastefulness by attempting to bring disparate pieces of
knowledge together to synthesize from the best aspects of different
disciplines an organic whole that is greater than the sum of its parts. One
that is boundaryless in its applicability, internally consistent, and of
immense practical import to law.
Although it is theoretically possible to integrate law's behavioral model
at the highest level of abstraction and generality, such wholesale change
is unlikely. In the near future it is probable that such conceptual
integration must proceed on an incremental, case-by-case basis. I have
therefore elsewhere proposed that law can be an active participant in
integrating the topic-specific behavioral models on which it relies by
undertaking the four-stage process (termed
"evolutionary analysis in law")
6
reproduced here in the Appendix.
For evolutionary analysis in law to prove useful, one needs, in brief, to
define law's goal with respect to a particular behavior, gather and evaluate
relevant information about what influences that behavior, synthesize
findings where appropriate, and apply the new knowledge in some fashion
that yields material improvements in law's ability to pursue its tasks.
Consequently, the first stage of the proposed model for evolutionary
analysis in law, The Identification Stage, frames the subject to analyze.
It clarifies one's legal goal, with respect to a defined aspect of human
behavior, and assesses the likelihood that evolutionary analysis can aid
14. Despite common fears, this scientific understanding of mind leaves ample room for free-will
and behavioral plasticity. It is probabilistic,not deterministic. At the same time, however, such an
understanding does require that any comprehensive model of human behavior acknowledge that a
number of common aspects of human psychology result in complex, condition-dependent behavioral
predispositions, the strength of which may vary from very strong to very weak, and from individual to

individual.
15. This theme is further developed in Wolfgang Fikentscher & Michael T. McGuire, A FourFunction Theory of Biology for Law, 25 RECHTSTHEORIE 291 (1994).
16. See generally Owen D. Jones, Evolutionary Analysis in Law: An Introduction and Application
to Child Abuse, 75 N.C. L. REv. 1117 (1997).
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pursuit of that goal. The Infornation Stage, in turn, collates information
from different disciplines on the multiple causes of the behavior relevant
to pursuit of the legal goal. It describes how one can explore evolutionary
theories on the origins of the behavior, examine the evidence bearing on
those theories' falsifiable predictions, assess the fit between theory and
evidence, evaluate robust theories' applicability in the human context, and
decide whether to include any specific evolutionary theory in the decisionmaking processes by which law pursues its goal. For those evolutionary
theories worthy of such inclusion, The Integration Stage then describes
how to classify important differences between evolutionary and prevailing
theories, to expose any true conflicts between them, and to integrate the
best parts of each. The Application Stage subsequently applies the
information generated by the previous stages to effect concrete improvements in the legal system. It describes how one can refine behavioral
models, generate new legal strategies for pursuing pre-articulated legal
goals, improve cost-benefit analyses that often drive various legal policies,
and provide new directions for future research initiatives.
Because the keystone of evolutionary analysis in law is integration, in
what follows I want to further examine the processes by which The
Integration Stage, the third stage of evolutionary analysis in law, might
usefully proceed.

II.

EVOLUTIONARY ANALYSIS IN LAW: PREDICATES TO INTEGRATION

To consider more thoroughly the manner in which evolutionary analysis
can assist in providing law with a more integrated behavioral model, it
will be necessary to first sketch a scenario that will lay the foundation for
subsequent discussion of the integrative process. Although this will take
a few pages to lay out, and will require a brief summary of several themes
I have explored elsewhere in greater depth, 17 I believe that in the end it
will lend solidity to abstractions, help to clarify the overall structure,
purpose, and utility of integration, and help to demonstrate what it would
mean to engage in a process by which law informs itself of an integrated
behavioral model. Of course, the integrative process is only relevant when
the predictions of evolutionary theories 8 coincide robustly with empirical
observations (for they will not always do so).
After highlighting
illustrative aspects of the theories and evidence, however, I will simply
posit such robustness and move on, rather than try to prove it in a separate

17. See id.
18. As here used, "evolutionary theories" refers to the mid-level theories (or sub-theories) of the
general meta-theory of evolution. See generally David M. Buss, Evolutionary Psychology: A New
Paradigmfor Psychological Science, 6 PSYCHOL. INQUIRY 1 (1995). Like many such meta-theories,
its logic begets a variety of mid-level theories or operational principles, like those of "sexual selection,"
"parental investment," and the like, that address entire domains of functioning.
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discussion. My focus is not ultimately on whether the specific theories set
out as examples in these predicate stages of evolutionary analysis are in
fact robust, but rather on how, assuming that they are, they can usefully
illustrate the integrative process, which is the subject of Part I11.

Suppose we want to consider how a more integrated model of human
behavior might aid the legal system in its efforts to reduce the incidence
of child abuse.19 During The Identification Stage of evolutionary analysis

in law, we must first assess the extent to which prominent, prevailing

theories about the causes of child abuse20 have improved law's ability to

regulate it, and then consider whether any theories grounded in evolutionary biology (or its close cousin evolutionary psychology) might contribute
to an understanding of the phenomenon.
Child abuse is generally thought to follow from the complex interplay
of exclusively social forces-including the summed influences of family,

friends, and community-within the unique context of an individual's
experience, including prior events, perceptions, and behavioral interactions.
With somewhat more specificity (but still a high degree of generalization),
the roughly forty-six theories purporting to explain child abuse sort loosely
into four models.2 ' The Social-Cultural Model attributes child abuse to
the interaction of social stressors like poverty and abuse-relevant cultural
norms. The Social-InteractionalModel places primary emphasis on the
unique characteristics and dynamic social context of each abusive parentchild relationship. The Transitional Model underscores the incremental
process by which child abuse can follow from reduced stress-tolerance and

mishandled provocations in the presence of "destabilizing factors." Lastly,
the Psychopathology Model locates the root of child abuse, for at least

19. By so early articulating a specific goal, one can minimize the extent to which subsequent
evolutionary analysis could, even unintendedly, encroach upon the normative functions properly reserved
to democratic processes. As many have noted, one would commit the "naturalistic fallacy" if arguing
that a description from biology (an "is") could alone imply a normative conclusion in law (an "ought
to be"). See, e.g., DAVID HUME, TREATISE OF HUMAN NATURE 469-70 (Book I, Part I, Section I)
(L.A. Selby-Bigge & P.H. Nidditch eds., 2d ed. 1978) (making famous the "no is to ought"
formulation); G. E. MOORE, PRINCIPIA ETHICA 62, 89-110 (Thomas Baldwin ed., 2d ed., Cambridge
University Press 1994) (1903) (coining "naturalistic fallacy" and using Social Darwinist Herbert Spencer
as an example).
20. "Child abuse" has many meanings. See, e.g., Richard Gelles, What to Learn from CrossCultural and Historical Research on Child Abuse and Neglect: An Overview, in CHILD ABUSE AND
NEGLECT: BIoSOCIAL DIMENSIONS (Richard J. Gelles & Jane B. Lancaster eds., 1987) [hereinafter
BIoSOCIAL DIMENSIONS] (discussing difficulties in defining child maltreatment). In this article, I use
"child abuse" to refer to the intentional or negligent infliction upon children of non-sexual physical
harm.
21. See generally Robert T. Ammerman, Predisposing Child Factors, in CHILDREN AT RISK: AN
EVALUATION OF FACTORS CONTRIBUTING TO CHILD ABUSE AND NEGLECT 199, 199-202 (Robert T.
Ammerman & Michel Hersen eds., 1990) [hereinafter CHILDREN AT RISK]; DAVID A. WOLFE, CHILD
ABUSE: IMPLICATIONS FOR CHILD DEVELOPMENT AND PSYCHOPATHOLOGY 44-68 (1987). The first three
of these models are the most traditional. See also THEORIES OF CHILD ABUSE AND NEGLECT:
DIFFERENTIAL PERSPECTIVES, SUMMARIES, AND EVALUATIONS (Oliver C.S. Tzeng et al. eds., 1991)
(grouping 46 separate theoretical viewpoints into nine paradigms). The child abuse theories can, of
course, be sorted in a variety of different ways.
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some abusive individuals, in a broader psychodynamic dysfunction, such
as parental psychiatric disturbance or mental illness.
Although none of the theories subsumed under this four-model
framework attempts to explain every instance of child abuse, each makes
a serious effort to make some sense of the phenomenon. Each identifies
environmental factors seemingly correlated with the incidence of abuse
and then posits plausible processes by which those factors, in dynamic
combination, may increase the risk of abusive behavior. While demonstrably helpful, however, these theories, like prevailing theories in most other
contexts, must be susceptible of useful improvement. For although they
identify factors that descriptively are associated with abuse, they have not
adequately explained why those factors, and not others, correlate positively
with the behavior. Moreover, the theories generally lack a sound
foundation in the processes by which the human brain (as an evolved
processor of social information) and human behavior (which on average
reflects the non-random patterns of that processing) developed over time.
In my view, then, the theories are necessarily incomplete. Although they
vary in particulars, each essentially locates all influences of significance
to child abuse within the present tense environmental boundaries of an
abusive individual's lifetime.
This common feature stands in sharp contrast to that of any evolutionary
perspectives, since the latter always expand the time frame in which
significant effects on studied behavior can be located. In the vast span of
evolutionary time, for instance, we might anticipate that natural selection
would have operated very powerfully upon behavioral predispositions that
influence the manner in which organisms treat juveniles-since generating
offspring and contributing toward their eventual reproduction represents
one of the principal processes by which genes replicate themselves.22
This fact suggests that behaviors affecting the treatment of juveniles (such
as neglecting, abusing, or killing them, as well as aggressively protecting
them from these acts) are paradigmatically topics on which an evolutionary analysis could likely provide great insight.
In the second stage of evolutionary analysis in law, The Information
Stage, we turn to explore evolutionary theories in detail, and, consistent
with scientific method, compare the falsifiable predictions of those theories
with empirical evidence. More specifically, in this stage of the analysis
we ask the following questions: 1) What are the relevant evolutionary
theories and predictions?; 2) What empirical evidence bears on those
predictions?; 3) How does the evidence fit the predictions?; 4) Do the
theories apply to humans?; and 5) Should the theories be considered in
legal analysis and policy-making?

22. See generally JOHN ALCOCK, ANIMAL BEHAVIOR (5th ed. 1993); DOUGLAS J. FUTUYMA,
EVOLUTIONARY BIOLOGY (2d ed. 1986). A brief overview for lawyers of evolutionary principles
appears at Jones, supra note 16, at Part I.
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There is no neat correlation in the study of animal behavior, of course,
to the study within traditional sociology or psychology of child abuse.
Instead, evolutionary biologists and evolutionary psychologists have tended
to focus on behavioral patterns in parental care generally, rather than on
some notion of "juvenile abuse" per se (whatever "abuse" would mean in
the non-human context). Nevertheless, some behaviors relevant to the
study of parental care clearly overlap with those we call child abuse in the
human context, and these are useful for comparison purposes.
Briefly, the fields of evolutionary biology and evolutionary psychology
maintain well-developed theories, supported by a great number of
empirical studies, regarding circumstances in which adult animals of
species that exhibit parental care for offspring would behave in ways
tending to cause injury or death to juveniles of their own species (either
directly, as by attack, or indirectly, as by a reduction in provided
resources). One subset of these theories focuses on infanticidal behavior.
Because the unambiguous reality of death obviates interpretive arguments
over relative quality of parental care, and relative effects of varying
parental care, this subset of "abusive" behaviors is worth careful
examination; it provides a good test case of an evolutionary theory's
robustness. And should such a theory prove robust, it is a relatively
simple matter to consider how it may shed light on the larger context of
parental care generally, as well as on the particular context of various
child-harming activities of humans.23
There are at least two evolutionary theories that link juvenile deaths to
evolved behavior.24 When considering these, it is important to remember
that making such a link does not require that every behavioral manifestation of evolved predispositions, in this case a juvenile's death, be directly
advantageous to the actor. Rather it is enough, in order for a behavioral
predisposition to have evolved, that the predisposition will, on average and
across all encountered contexts, lead to increases in the inclusive fitness
of the organisms bearing it.
23. But see Richard J. Gelles, Physical Violence, Child Abuse, and Child Homicide: A Continuum
of Violence, or Distinct Behaviors?, 2 HUM. NATURE 59 (1991) [hereinafter A Continuum of Violence?]
(suggesting that infanticide and non-fatal abuse may be discontinuous).
24. There is a massive theoretical and empirical literature on infanticide, and I cannot provide any
but the most cursory description of it here. My purpose, once again, is not to establish whether these
evolutionary theories are robust, but rather to explore what we might do with them if they are. Thus
far, the majority of biologists who have studied the issue find that the data fit these theories quite
compellingly. See, e.g., INFANTICIDE & PARENTAL CARE (Stefano Parmigiani & Frederick S. vom Saal
eds., 1994); INFANTICIDE: COMPARATIVE AND EVOLUTIONARY PERSPECTIVES 43 (Glen Hausfater &
Sarah Blaffer Hrdy eds., 1984); and sources cited in Jones, supra note 16.
The earliest elaboration and classification of evolutionary theories on infanticide is Sarah Blaffer
Hrdy, Infanticide Among Animals: A Review, Classification,and Examination of The Implications for
The Reproductive Strategies of Females, 1 ETHOL. & SOCIOBIOL. 13 (1979). Hrdy identified four
theories of adaptive infanticidal behavior, two of which (concerning fatal exploitation of infants as a
resource and infanticide incident to competition for resources) are not relevant here. I refer to the two
that are relevant by different names than appeared in the original only to avoid confusion among nonbiologists.
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According to the first theory, given its most powerful articulation by
evolutionary psychologists Martin Daly and Margo Wilson, some juvenile
deaths are the by-product of an evolved, generally adaptive, psychological

mechanism known as "discriminative parental solicitude" (or "DPS").
This mechanism is believed to facilitate the delivery of finite parental
resources to those individuals most capable of turning the investment of
such resources into parental reproductive success. 2' Natural selection
would inevitably favor such a mechanism, once it arose, because it would
better optimize inclusive fitness returns than would indiscriminate
investment of the same resources.26

If such a mechanism exists, one

would expect to see individuals biasing their resources toward kin
compared to non-kin (in patterns sensitive to probable degrees of
relatedness). 27 One would also expect to see individuals biasing their
resources among kin equally related to them (such as offspring) in patterns
sensitive to observable attributes of the offspring (such as health, size, or
deformity) that predict its eventual ability to translate parental investment
into subsequent reproductive success" -and also sensitive to probable
payoffs from contributing the same parental investment to alternative loci
(such as to future offspring). 29

There are thus two ways DPS, as an information-processing mechanism
of an evolved psychology, could contribute to the incidence of juvenile
deaths. First, a juvenile dependent on an unrelated adult would be
statistically more likely to die of neglect or to be killed by that adult, than

would an offspring of the same adult. This is because the infant would
not, on average, evoke the same solicitousness as would an offspring of
that adult, and because the adult will therefore, on average, be less
tolerant, less willing to provide, and less protective of the infant than

would be that infant's own parent. From this perspective, a child may be
25. For more on the subject of this paragraph, see Martin Daly & Margo Wilson, Discriminative
ParentalSolicitude and the Relevance of Evolutionary Models to the Analysis of Motivational Systems,
in THE COGNrrVE NEUROSCIENCES 1269 (Michael Gazzaniga ed., 1995) [hereinafter Discriminative
ParentalSolicitude]; MARTIN DALY & MARGO WILSON, HOMICIDE 42-43 (1988); Martin Daly & Margo
Wilson, Evolutionary Social Psychology and Family Homicide, 242 SCIENCE 519 (1988) [hereinafter
Evolutionary Social Psychology] (concerning confirmations of DPS predictions in many empirical
studies); Robert L. Trivers, Parent-OffspringConflict, 14 AM. ZOOL. 249 (1974).
26. See generally Trivers, supra note 25.
27. Martin Daly & Margo I. Wilson, Abuse and Neglect of Children in Evolutionary Perspective,
in NATURAL SELECTION AND SOCIAL BEHAVIOR 405 (Richard D. Alexander & Donald W. Tinkle eds.,
1981). Natural selection effectively penalizes a propensity to squander parental resources on non-kin.
Parents that allocate a substantial proportion of their investment to non-kin will transmit fewer copies
of their own genes into future generations than will parents that discriminate against non-kin in their
provision of resources.
28. See Martin Daly & Margo I. Wilson, Child Maltreatmentfrom a Sociobiological Perspective,
in DEVELOPMENTAL PERSPECTIVES ON CHILD MALTREATMENT 93 (Ross Rizley & Dante Cicchetti eds.,
1981). See also Margo Wilson & Martin Daly, The Psychology of Parenting in Evolutionary
Perspective and the Case of Human Filicide, in INFANTICIDE & PARENTAL CARE, supra note 24, at 73;
HOMICIDE, supra note 25, each source building on the work of RICHARD ALEXANDER, DARWINISM AND
HUMAN AFFAIRS 109 (1979).
29. See generally DiscriminativeParentalSolicitude, supra note 25.
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at increased risk of death not because it is affirmatively adaptive for the
parent to kill him, but as a byproduct of the fact that natural selection has
left the adult without any evolved psychological mechanisms prompting
him or her to devote to unrelated juveniles the same extraordinary care
that protects related children from life's encounters and lavishes upon
them the resources necessary to their own survival and eventual reproduction.
Second, a juvenile exhibiting traits predictive of a low RS return on
parental investment (compared to the probable payoff from investment
elsewhere) would be statistically more likely to die of neglect, abandonment, or infliction of fatal injury, even if genetically related to the
resource-provider a
Natural selection will simply favor geneticallyinfluenced behaviors, expressed in adults, that reduced parental investment
in a particular offspring toward zero as the offspring's probable contribution to parental reproductive success approached zero-and as the benefits
of redirecting parental investment toward that offspring's existing or future
sibling were likely to be greater than the benefits of its own continued
support. For even though offspring are principal vehicles for increasing
parental reproductive success, the allocation of parental resources that best
maximizes a parent's inclusive fitness returns does not necessarily
maximize that of a particular offspring.3
DPS can, for example,
increase the reproductive success of animal parents by predisposing them
to allocate more resources to a more-promising offspring at the expense
of a less-promising one (or indeed to abandon offspring evidencing cues
of infirmity) and to invest elsewhere, such as in future offspring, the
resources thereby released.
The logic of the DPS theory of juvenile harm generates a number of
specific and falsifiable predictions about non-random patterns of age, sex,
birth order, inter-birth interval, and prior health indicators of dead
juveniles, as well as the ages of homicidal mothers, and the relative
amounts of resources available to homicidal parent(s), that would be
observable if an evolved human psychology manifested discriminative
parental solicitude.32 For example, children unrelated to a parent,
children born physically or mentally handicapped, children born to parents
with few resources, and children born after numerous prior siblings would
be at increased risk of abuse.
The Reproductive Access theory is the second evolutionary theory that
links juvenile deaths to evolved behavior. It attributes some of those
deaths to an evolved, generally adaptive psychological mechanism in the
males of many species that nurse their young. In such a species there is

30. See Martin Daly, Parent-Offspring Conflict and Violence in Evolutionary Perspective, in
SOCIOBIOLOGY AND THE SOCIAL SCIENCES 25 (Robert Bell & Nancy Bell eds., 1989).
31. See Trivers, supra note 25; Wilson & Daly, supra note 28.
32. See generally Daly, supra note 30.
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typically a contraceptive effect to nursing (which appears to adaptively
regulate the inter-birth interval, which might otherwise be so short as to
be suboptimal for raising each of numerous infants to independence).33
Because the cessation of nursing brings a female back into estrus far
earlier than if an infant nurses to weaning age, natural selection would
inevitably favor any heritable psychological mechanism predisposing a
male to eliminate unrelated, unweaned infants of females with whom he
might mate. Such selective infanticide would shorten each female's interbirth interval and increase the probability that the male can garner faster
access to her reproductive capabilities and thereby earlier commence his
own gene replication through her.34
Like the DPS theory, this Reproductive Access theory of juvenile harm
also generates a number of specific and falsifiable predictions about nonrandom patterns of weaning status of dead juveniles, relatedness of
juvenile to infanticidal male, period of infanticidal male's access to
juvenile's mother, probability of infanticidal male actually impregnating
juvenile's mother, and the presence of evolved female counterstrategies to
prevent potentially infanticidal males from killing their infants, that would
likely be observable if an evolved human psychology reflected such an
adaptation. The theory predicts, for example, that children will be at
greater risk of death or abuse in a home with a stepfather than in one
without, and that risk would be heavily biased toward children in the
nursing years.
Now although it is not yet widely known outside evolutionary biology
circles, an extraordinarily broad and deep body of theoretical and empirical
work has revealed powerful evidence that across a wide variety of species
these two theories' predictions tightly, sometimes almost incredibly tightly,
match observable reality. 35 A few representative examples, from among
the voluminous studies:
* In numerous bird species, parents actively eliminate the one chick of
two or more that has the poorest survival prospects.36

33. This temporary contraceptive effect is known as lactational amenorrhea. R.D. Martin,
Phylogenetic Aspects of Primate Reproduction: The Context of Advanced Maternal Care, in
MOTHERHOOD IN HUMAN AND NONHUMAN PRIMATES: BIOSOCIAL DETERMINANTS 16 (C.R. Pryce et al.

eds., 1994). The effect is operative in humans. Id. at 25; Audrey E. Rosner & Susan K. Schulman,
Birth Interval Among Breast-Feeding Women Not Using Contraceptives,86 PEDIATRICS 747 (November
1990); ELAINE MORGAN, THE DESCENT OF THE CHILD: HUMAN EVOLUTION FROM A NEW PERSPECTIVE

83 (1994).
34. See Glenn Hausfater, Infanticide in Langurs: Strategies, Counterstrategies, and Parameter
Values, in INFANTICIDE: COMPARATIVE AND EVOLUTIONARY PERSPECTIVES, supra note 24, at 257.
35. See, e.g., INFANTICIDE & PARENTAL CARE, supra note 24; INFANTICIDE: COMPARATIVE AND
EVOLUTIONARY PERSPECTIVES, supra note 24.

36. L. Scott Forbes & Douglas W. Mock, Proximate and Ultimate Determinants of Avian Brood
Reduction, in INFANTICIDE & PARENTAL CARE, supra note 24, at 237, 238 (surveying the literature).
The likelihood of infanticide is inversely correlated with the availability of resources. Id.
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* In many rodent species, intruding males generally kill all unrelated
young at any opportunity.37 Significantly, the infanticidal behavior
typically correlates closely with the female reproductive cycle, diminishing precisely one gestation period after the male's ejaculation. It reemerges after a period precisely equivalent to that of the female's birthto-weaning
interval (when the male's own offspring might be pres38
ent).
* In lions, newly dominant males routinely kill every unweaned cub
present at the time of their takeover (except during takeovers of prides
whose members are closely related to them).39 Infanticide by male
lions accounts for nearly 25% of all deaths of nursing cubs (with the
risk to a cub of being killed declining rapidly with age).40 Although
the composition of males in a pride changes periodically, all surviving
cubs in a pride have been sired by the resident males.4 Females
exhibit male-specific behavior that reduces the risk of infanticide.
- In primates, it is widely accepted that infanticide: 1) is committed
almost exclusively by adult males unrelated to the killed infant; 2)
almost exclusively targets unweaned infants; 3) is almost exclusively
committed by newly dominant adult males; 4) prompts the mother of a
killed infant to resume sexual receptivity within days or weeks
(significantly more quickly than if the infant survived); 5) usually results
in the killing male siring the next offspring of the female whose infant
he killed; 6) is not confined to high-density populations or to animals
living in disturbed habitat; and 7) can be predictably provoked (in the
experimental context) by removing a group's dominant male.42

37. See generally U. William Huck, Infanticide and the Evolution of Pregnancy Block in Rodents,
in INFANTICIDE: COMPARATIVE AND EVOLUTIONARY PERSPECTIVES, supra note 24, at 349, 354 (citing
Huck et al., Infanticide in Male LaboratoryMice: Effects of Social Status, PriorSexual Experience, and
Basisfor Discriminationbetween Related and Unrelated Young, 30 ANIM. BEHAV. 1158 (1982) (onehalf of males killed unrelated pups, while only one-fifteenth of males killed their own pups)); Robert
W. Elwood & Hazel F. Kennedy, Selective Allocation of Parental and Infanticidal Responses in
Rodents:,A Review of Mechanisms, in INFANTICIDE & PARENTAL CARE, supra note 24, at 397; Glenn
Perrigo & Frederick S. vom Saal, Behavioral Cycles and the Neural Timing of Infanticideand Parental
Behavior in Male House Mice, in INFANTICIDE & PARENTAL CARE, supra note 24, at 365.
38. See, e.g., Perrigo & vom Saal, supra note 37, at 365, 366; Frederick S. vom Saal, Proximate
and Ultimate Causes of Infanticide and Parental Behavior in Male House Mice, in INFANTICIDE:
COMPARATIVE AND EVOLUTIONARY PERSPECTIVES, supra note 24, at 401.

39. See Anne E. Pusey & Craig Packer, Infanticide in Lions: Consequencesand Counterstrategies,
in INFANTICIDE & PARENTAL CARE, supra note 24, at 277, 279-80 (unrelated adult males and subadults
are generally evicted). A nursing female cannot conceive before her cubs reach 18 months of age.
Should her cubs die, however, she becomes sexually receptive within days. It has been estimated that
by killing small cubs intruding males could sire their own cubs eight months earlier, on average, than
if they spared them. Id.
40. Id. (describing findings based on DNA analyses).
41. Dennis A. Gilbert et al., Analytical DNA Fingerprintingin Lions: Parentage,Genetic Diversity,
and Kinship, 82 J. HERED. 378 (1991).
42. During a two-decade study of 1000 langur monkeys, for example, males invading a breeding
group killed nearly 30% of all infants bom within the troop. At least 95% of the time those males
killed unrelated infants, and at least 75% of the time the infanticidal male succeeded in siring
subsequent offspring with the victim's mother, following a significantly shortened interbirth interval.
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Those most qualified to review this evidence find it compelling, and the
DPS and Reproductive Access theories are therefore relatively
uncontroversial. Indeed, each now appears in major textbooks on evolved
animal behavior. 3
But most significantly for our purposes, the patterns that emerge in
human populations conform rather precisely to patterns predicted by the
DPS and Reproductive Access theories and observable in other animal
species. 44 For example, human children most at risk of abuse are those
with birth defects, in families with scarce resources, later in birth order,
or in homes with unrelated males.45 Indeed, children in the United States
under two years old are about 100 times more at risk of lethal abuse at the
hands of stepparents than of genetic parents. 46 And despite numerous
attempts to distinguish these results, 47 no other known variable, such as
economic class, appears as strongly correlated to this pattern.4 More-

See Sarah Blaffer Hrdy et al., Infanticide: Let's Not Throw Out the Baby With the Bathwater, 3 Evo.
ANTHRO. 151 (1994/95).
43. See, e.g., ALCOCK, supra note 22, at 2-6; J.R. KREBS & N.B. DAVIES, AN INTRODUCTION TO
BEHAVIOURAL ECOLOGY 4-10 (1993); ROBERT TRiVERS, SOCIAL EVOLUTION (1985).
44. See INFANTICIDE & PARENTAL CARE, supra note 24, chs. 1-5; INFANTICIDE: COMPARATIVE AND
EVOLUTIONARY PERSPECTIVES, supra note 24, chs. 22-25; and Jones, supra note 16, at Part H.B.2.c
(surveying literature on patterns in human infanticide).
45. Sarah Blaffer Hrdy & Glenn Hausfater, Comparative and Evolutionary Perspectives on
Infanticide: Introduction and Overview [hereinafter Comparative and Evolutionary Perspectives on
Infanticide], in INFANTICIDE: COMPARATIVE AND EVOLUTIONARY PERSPECTIVES, supra note 24, at xxxi.
46. Evolutionary Social Psychology, supra note 25, at 520; HOMICIDE, supra note 25, at 89. See
Martin Daly & Margo Wilson, Child Abuse Risk and Household Composition in Hamilton, 31 J.
ONTARIO ASSOC. CHILDREN'S AID SOCIETIES 11, 11-12 (1986) [hereinafter Child Abuse Risk and
Household Composition]; Martin Daly & Margo Wilson, Child Abuse and Other Risks of Not Living
With Both Parents,6 ETHOL. & SOCIOBIOL. 197, 205 & 202 Fig. 1 (1985) [hereinafter Child Abuse and
Other Risks]. Subsequent studies consistently find dramatically elevated risk for children living with
substitute parents. Evolutionary Social Psychology, supra note 25 (70 times greater in Canada);
Discriminative ParentalSolicitude, supra note 25; Martin Daly & Margo I. Wilson, Some Differential
Attributes of Lethal Assaults on Small Children by Stepfathers versus Genetic Fathers, 15 ETHOL. &
SOCIOBIOL. 207, 210 (1994) [hereinafter DifferentialAttributes] (60 times greater in Canada). See also
Martin Daly & Margo Wilson, Children as Homicide Victims, in BIOSOCIAL DIMENSIONS, supra note
20, at 201; Evolutionary Social Psychology, supra note 25, at 520. These results are consistent with
studies in other countries, which have also found an increased risk of lethal and sublethal abuse to
children living with at least one substitute parent. See, e.g., Susan J. Creighton, An Epidemiological
Study of Abused Children and Their Families in the United Kingdom Between 1977 and 1982, 9 CHILD
ABUSE AND NEGLECT 441 (1985); J. Wadsworth et al., Family Type and Accidents in Preschool
Children, 37 J. EPIDEM. & COMMuN. HEALTH 100 (1983); P.D. Scott, Fatal Battered Baby Cases, 13
MED., Sci. & L. 197 (1973); D.M. FERGUSSON ET AL., CHILD ABUSE IN NEW ZEALAND (1972); Daly
& Wilson, supra note 27.
47. See, e.g., A Continuum of Violence?, supra note 23; Glenn D. Wolfner & Richard J. Gelles, A
Profile of Violence Toward Children: A National Study, 17 CHILD ABUSE & NEGLECT 197 (1993).
Replying, see Martin Daly & Margo Wilson, A Reply To Gelles: Stepchildren Are Disproportionately
Abused, And Diverse Forms Of Violence Can Share Causal Factors, 2 HUM. NATURE 419, 421-22
(1991).
48. A number of variables possibly confounding the significance of this conclusion were proposed,
both by the authors and by others. See, e.g., Martin Daly et al., Household Composition and the Risk
of Child Abuse and Neglect, 12 J. BioSOC. SCI. 333 (1980); Child Abuse and Other Risks, supra note
46; Martin Daly & Margo Wilson, Risk of Maltreatment of Children Living With Stepparents, in
BIOSOCIAL DIMENSIONS, supra note 20, at 215; Child Abuse Risk and Household Composition, supra
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over, research reveals that stepfathers not only kill children at higher rates
than genetic fathers, but they also kill them in different ways and for
different reasons." They are, for example, about 120 times more likely
to beat a child to death than is a homicidal genetic father.5 °
A reportedly tight fit between theory and data during this Information
Stage of evolutionary analysis does not, of course, automatically make
applicable in the human context any theory apparently applicable in the
non-human context. Independent causal processes can often lead to
similar results. So assessing the relative probable applicabilities of
different evolutionary theories to the human context will always depend,
in part, on a careful and intelligent evaluation of potentially distinguishing
differences between evolution of the human species and that of other
species.
For example, both the DPS and Reproductive Access theories predict
that, all else being equal, adults unrelated to an infant will be more likely,
per capita, to neglect, injure, or kill an infant than would be an adult
related to the infant. The former theory predicts this because natural
selection is very unlikely to have produced an evolved psychological
predisposition to treat unrelated juveniles as solicitously as related
juveniles. The latter theory predicts this because natural selection would
favor even the slightest predisposition to selectively eliminate unweaned
infants dependant on a potential mate, if such infanticide tended to
increase the access of an infanticidal male to the reproductive resources of
the infant's mother, compared to the access to her of males that are not
infanticidal. And yet researchers currently conclude that patterns of child
death and abuse in human populations are more likely to be a product of
DPS than of a psychological mechanism reflecting an adaptive predisposition to context-specific selective infanticide. The Reproductive Access
theory is expected to have greatest selective advantage in, and indeed
appears to be most prominent in, species reflecting harem-style monopolization of breeding females by a few males, and relatively short tenure of
such males in such status.5' Since in human populations these conditions
appear never to have been as prevalent as they now are in some related

note 46; Richard J. Gelles & John W. Harrop, The Risk of Abusive Violence Among Children With
Nongenetic Caretakers, 40 FAM. REL. 78 (1991).
These included such things as the well-known
relationship between decreased income and increased risk of abuse as well as family size, reporting
bias, detection bias, duration of co-residency, maternal youth, and the like. Each potential confound
was considered and rejected in the principal, as well as subsequent, studies. See, e.g., Daly & Wilson,
Risk of Maltreatment of Children Living With Stepparents, in BIOSOCIAL DIMENSIONS, supra note 20,
at 215, 225-26. Alternative hypotheses fail, for example, to explain why abusive stepparents appear to
differentially abuse unrelated children in the house when sparing their own children in the house. J.L.
Lightcap et al., Child Abuse: A Test of Some Predictionsfrom Evolutionary Theory, 3 ETOL. &
SOCIOBIOL. 17 (1981).
49. DifferentialAttributes, supra note 46, at 216.
50. Id. at 211.
51. See, e.g., Richard D. Alexander, The View From the President's Window, 4 HUM. BEHAV. &
EVOL. Soc'Y NEWSLETrER 2 (No. 2, Sept. 1995).
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primates that practice infanticide, the Reproductive Access theory is
expected to have commensurately less applicability than the DPS theory
in the human context.52
Should a seemingly robust evolutionary theory, like the DPS theory, that
appears to have currency in the human context, be included with that mass
of theories and information that policy-makers should consider when
assessing how law can best leverage against an appropriate behavioral
model? Elsewhere I have argued that a rebuttable presumption of
inclusion is the most appropriate presumption in this context. 5 In the
case of the DPS theory of child abuse, employing that presumption will
facilitate our consideration of the truly integrative aspects of this proposed
method for conducting evolutionary analysis in law.
III.

EVOLUTIONARY ANALYSIS IN LAW: THE INTEGRATIVE PROCESS

In Part II we began to explore how evolutionary analysis might lead to
a more usefully integrated model for understanding child abuse.
Specifically, we traced how, during the Identification and Information
stages of that analysis, we might preliminarily evaluate whether an
evolutionary approach was worth pursuing and then, if it seemed so,
separately consider the prevailing and evolutionary theories about the
many influences contributing to abusive behavior. This also entailed
comparing predictions of theories with facts, assessing the applicability of
bio-behavioral theories to humans, and deciding whether seemingly robust
theories should inform legal analysis and policy-making.
We come, then, to the main focus of our inquiry here-to The
Integration Stage. In this stage one tries to extract some coherent, lawuseful model that might connect prevailing theories on the socio-cultural
causes of child abuse, evolutionary theories about the evolved psychology
of parental care, and the many bits of data from non-human and human
animals that reveal patterns in infant-killing and abuse. Simply assume,
for the purposes of exploring this integrative process, that the foregoing
stages have led us to the point where evolutionary theory concerning
behavior harmful to juveniles, which posits an evolved discriminative
parental solicitude, has been deemed sufficiently robust to be considered
during policy-making processes with that mass of other seemingly robust
theories about the causes of child abuse.
Attempting to integrate
prevailing and evolutionary theories, the most challenging aspect of

52. Of course, when trying to decide whether theories of demonstrated robustness are applicable
to explain behavior patterns in humans that are the same as those elsewhere in the animal kingdom, it
is alleged human difference from the rest of the animal kingdom, not sameness with it, that requires
argument with particularity. Dispassionate, non-anthropocentric evaluation of the applicability of such
a theory to humans requires a rebuttable presumption of applicability rather than of non-applicability.
53. See Jones, supra note 16, at Part 1.B.5.
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evolutionary analysis in law, requires that we first discover where, if
anywhere, prevailing and evolutionary theories conflict.
A.

Isolating Conflicts

One way to isolate conflicts is to look separately for differences between
fundamental theoretical substructures, on one hand, and differences
between predictions generated by the theories, on the other. Although
conflicts in either of these two contexts would be significant, the manners
in which they arise differ in ways relevant to integrative efforts.
Differences between the theoretical substructures of the prevailing and
evolutionary theories are likely to be of two kinds: 1) differences in the
levels of analysis; and 2) differences in basic assumptions. Typically,
prevailing theories operate at what biologists term the level of proximate
causation. Proximate causes (similar but not identical to proximate causes
in law) describe the immediate causes-the "hows" of behavior-that for
instance explain how environmental conditions prompt internal processes
that in turn lead an organism to manifest a particular behavior. Evolutionary theories, on the other hand, operate at what biologists term the level
of ultimate causation. Ultimate causes describe evolutionary processes-the "whys" of behavior-that explain why a behavior came to be
commonly observable in a given species. Causes at this level of analysis
are typically understood in terms of the reproductive consequences of
behavior.54
An example may help to clarify how a given behavior can be understood both in terms of proximate and ultimate causation. Male frogs of
many species, such as the tellingly-named spring peeper, croak in the
spring. In proximate terms, they croak because seasonal changes in such
things as day length or wet weather trigger specific hormonal and
neurochemical fluctuations that lead, eventually, to the inflation and
deflation of airspaces bordered by elastic tissue. This causes air to pass
through specifically shaped structures that generate sound waves of
particular frequencies. In ultimate terms, widespread croaking reflects the
fact that the remote ancestors of today's croaking males left more
descendants than did those less predisposed to croak. To the extent that
croaking helped, for example, to advertise good health and thereby both
to attract mates and to defend territory, it was adaptive. And to the extent
that the ability to croak and the urge to respond to certain environmental

54. For more on proximate and ultimate causation, see ALCOCK, supra note 22, at 2-6; John Alcock
& Paul Sherman, The Utility of the Proximate-Ultimate Dichotomy in Ethology, 96 ETHOL. 58 (1994);
GOLDSMITH, supra note 9, at 3-11, 46-69; Owen D. Jones, Genes, Behavior, and Law 15 POL. & LIFE
SCIENCES 101 (1996); Bobbi S. Low, Human Sex Differences in Behavioral EcologicalPerspective, 16
ANALYSE & KRITIK 1 (1994).
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cues with croaking were heritable, the proportion of males in successive
generations that croaked inevitably increased over time until we now
observe the trait to be typical of males in a given frog species.
Neither level of analysis, neither proximate nor ultimate, is complete
without the other. Thus, if one were truly interested in gaining a more
complete understanding of what "causes" croaking, the identification of
proximate causes would be descriptive without being fully explanatory.
That is, identifying proximate causes tells us exactly nothing about why
wet weather rather than dry weather correlates with specific physiological
changes, or why those changes yield croaking rather than one of the
innumerable alternative behaviors, such as quiet motionlessness or
hibernation.
This simply means that most behavior (really all behavior, in the
broadest sense) is enabled by two distinct kinds of causes (as well as, on
occasion, multiple causes of each kind). Proximate factors would have
nothing to influence, absent senses to perceive them and an informationprocessing system to analyze them. Similarly, the particular combinations
of sensors and processors that each species exhibits themselves evolved (at
least in large part) because heritable variations in sensing and processing,
in the presence of specific environmental contexts, resulted in differential
reproductive success. Knowing this, anyone seeking a more complete
understanding of human behavior, or developing or evaluating theories of
causation in the human context, should understand that causes come in
pairs and should, whenever studying one, look also for the other.
This of course requires that one maintain a constant self-awareness of
the kind of causation (that is, the level of analysis) at which one's logic is
currently operating. Lawyers (and other members of the social sciences)
would be well advised to do so. Failure to recognize explicitly the
existence of different levels of inquiry into the causes of law-relevant
behavior often prompts an unexamined and counterproductive assumption
that prevailing and evolutionary theories are incompatible--even when
they may not be. For example, because they failed to recognize that
prevailing and evolutionary theories of child abuse speak to causation in
different levels of analysis, even the most careful child abuse authors have
often mistakenly implied that largely compatible explanations are, instead,
alternative ones.55
Evolutionary forces inevitably shaped a species-typical neural architecture that non-randomly generates psychological states. These, in turn and
on average, predispose individuals to behave in patterned ways in response
to certain kinds of encountered environmental conditions. Thus, every
study of ultimate causation will point toward proximate, environmental
55. See, e.g., Marilyn Coleman, Stepfamilies in the United States: ChallengingBiased Assumptions,
in STEPFAMILIES: WHO BENEFITS? WHO DOES NOT? (Alan Booth & Judy Dunn eds., 1994) (attacking
invocation of evolutionary theories of stepparent mistreatment of stepchildren).
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causes (some of which may have already been identified by careful social
science observation). Not only do evolutionary causes not compete with
developmental or environmental causes, they in fact require them.
For example, evolutionary theory makes obvious that it will become
powerfully maladaptive for an organism to treat non-kin and kin alike for
all purposes as soon as another organism manifests a heritable predisposition to favor his relatives. But it is only through a psychological state,
evoking discriminative parental solicitude as a function of proximate
conditions (such as those providing relatedness cues, or those providing
cues to the relative probable contribution to reproductive success that this
infant can make given the parent's available resources) that the logic of
adaptation can be vindicated. Consequently, it will often be advantageous
to begin integrative efforts by identifying differences between prevailing
and evolutionary theories in levels of analysis, so as not too quickly to
conclude that the theories conflict.
The basic assumptions of prevailing and evolutionary theories offer
more fertile ground for discovering true conflicts. Yet here, too, apparent
conflicts can be false conflicts. For example, traditional social science
theories often differ from evolutionary theories by implicitly or explicitly
presupposing that significant (or at least most law-relevant) human
behavior is unaffected by human evolutionary history. Whether this
assumption is found in the deafening silence of non-talk about evolved
behavior, or in straw-man attacks on supposed genetic determinism, it
typically denies that there is any evolved human psychology worth
noting-beyond the raw capacity to reason. Evolutionary theories, in
contrast, assume that evolutionary processes can, and indeed do, through
the relentless effects of natural selection on the persistence and distribution
of gene combinations, importantly influence human nature and thus human
behavior. (While it is not the province of evolutionary biologists to try to
locate precise gene combinations that influence behaviors, it is fundamental to their discipline that such combinations be capable of influencing
behaviors.)
When assessing the extent to which prevailing and evolutionary theories
are compatible, of course, this difference between basic assumptions will
be most relevant only if the assumptions lead to an unavoidable conflict
between the theories. An unavoidable conflict, by definition, must be one
resulting from at least two assumptions that are at once both necessary to
each theory and mutually exclusive (i.e., incapable of simultaneous truth).
Of course, the very process of ascribing "necessary" and "mutually
exclusive" status to foundational assumptions is fraught with traps. To be
meaningful, these must be objective rather than subjective designations.
And this requires a skeptical view even of works emanating from the
prevailing and evolutionary traditions. Given pre-existing disciplinary
divisions, subjective perceptions of conflict between them may reflect the
artificial dualism earlier referenced. For example, an uncritical eye might
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allow to pass unchallenged such seemingly common bootstrapping logic
as this:
" Either a particular behavior is learned or it is caused by genes;
* We can demonstrate that this behavior can be learned;
" Therefore genes do not significantly influence the incidence of that
behavior.

Here, the conclusion might itself appear to be an assumption basic to the
behavioral theory. In reality, it only follows from the prior assumption
that genetic and enviromnental explanations of the behavior are alternative.

In such a case, an apparent conflict about the influence of genes on
behavior is only a false conflict, posing no significant obstacle to
disciplinary and theoretical integration. The perception of conflict reflects
misapprehension of the biology of behavior.
To illustrate: the standard social science model scholarship on the causes

of child abuse makes scant reference to evolutionary influences upon
diverse child-rearing behaviors.56 The few references one can uncover
are almost universally dismissive-typically misstating, before then
rejecting, evolutionary propositions." While there are a small number
of scholars in sociology and related disciplines who have moved to

consider more holistic, biosocial perspectives on child abuse,58 the vast

bulk of the child abuse literature still reads as if Darwin never lived, Daly

& Wilson never wrote, and acknowledging any significant evolutionary
influences on trends in abusive behavior would eviscerate favorite social
science theories.

A lack of evolutionary and genetic influences on

behavior, it seems, is a basic-though in fairness often unexamined-assumption of popular child abuse models.
Logically, however, we might consider the assumption that child abuse

is unaffected by human genetic substructures to be a function of

exclusionary bias, rather than an exclusionary necessity.59 That is, while

many social science theorists may assert or imply that their theories

56. See, e.g., CHILDREN AT RISK, supra note 21.
57. See, e.g., UNDERSTANDING CHILD ABUSE AND NEGLECT, Panel on Research on Child Abuse and
Neglect, Commission on Behavioral and Social Sciences and Education, National Research Council 122
(1993) [hereinafter UNDERSTANDING CHILD ABUSE AND NEGLECT].
The Panel dismissed the
significance of evolutionary perspectives after characterizing them as concerned with mechanisms
designed "to enhance the chances of survival of the species." It would be difficult to misstate
evolutionary theory by a wider margin. See generally Jones, supra note 16 (providing an overview of
the basic principles of modem evolutionary theory and their application to parent-offspring conflicts).
58. Richard Gelles, David Popenoe, Robert L. Burgess, and James Garbarino are examples. See,
e.g., Michael T. McGuire & Richard Gelles, Family Violence, Evolutionary Biology, and the Law, in
GEWALT IN DER KLEINGRUPPE UND DAS RECHT, 3 FESTSCHRIFT MARTIN USTERI, SCHRIFTEN ZUR

RECHTSPSYCHOLOGIE (forthcoming 1997); DAVID POPENOE, LIFE WITHOUT FATHER (1996); Robert L.
Burgess & James Garbarino, Doing What Comes Naturally?: An Evolutionary Perspective on Child
Abuse, in THE DARK SIDE OF FAMILIES 88 (Finkelhor et al. eds., 1983).
59. See Jones, supra note 16, at Part II.C.1.
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depend on a lack of evolved behavioral predispositions, it is not necessary,
to their theory that abuse is caused by social stressors, for example, that
there be no evolved predisposition of the human psychology to find
particular kinds of stimuli stressful. In contrast, it is critically necessary
to evolutionary theories, and in a way qualitatively different, that genes are
capable of influencing human behavior in important ways, and are
incessantly pruned by natural selection. But, even so, this difference
between prevailing and evolutionary theories is a false conflict only. As
when evaluating differences between prevailing and evolutionary theories
at their levels of analysis, then, we must similarly not be too quick to find
conflict among differences in their basic assumptions.
Of course, should we identify true conflicts between basic assumptions,
we may use them to help us locate eventual conflicts between the
predictions of prevailing and evolutionary theories, to which effort we
would next need to turn, in any event. For the process of identifying
differences relevant to the integrative process requires that we simply
compare the theories' respective predictions one to another, with requisite
scrutiny of their particularity, as well as their overlaps and disjunctions.
Nevertheless, even theories that differ markedly in their particulars may
generate the same predictions, generate overlapping predictions that are not
in conflict, generate overlapping predictions where the overlapped
predictions are identical, or generate one set of predictions that subsumes
the other set and extends to more besides.'
For example, the prevailing theories on child abuse predict that a wide
variety of environmental conditions known to be "stressful" will increase
the risk of child abuse. These include, for example, poverty, parental
youth or immaturity, unemployment, substance abuse, single-parent status,
child handicap, unusual family composition, and so on. The evolutionary
theories also predict that these conditions will be positively associated with
child abuse, since each of these factors would likely have had a direct
bearing on the probability, during any given ancestral human environment
of evolutionary adaptation, that any given child would contribute
substantially to parental reproductive success-and since an evolved
psychology would therefore likely be powerfully alert to their presence.
Despite first impression on encountering the two kinds of theories, these
predictions are therefore not in direct conflict.
This remains true even though the predictions of the evolutionary
theories are in some cases more specific, reflecting the premise that the
human brain has evolved to weight some of these factors more heavily
than others when it processes information. For example, DPS theory
predicts that lack of genetic relationship between adult and child is

60.

Prevailing theories (and less commonly evolutionary theories) do not always enumerate their

predictions in ways facilitating direct comparison. Such cases require attempts to articulate predictions
from logic alone, or to redefine existing predictions in terms common to both theories.
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expected to be a far more significant predictor of child maltreatment than,
for example, single-parent status (each among relevant population
samples). But while greater specificity of either evolutionary or prevailing
theories can suggest that one or the other contributes more toward an
ability to accurately predict patterns of behavior, greater specificity of one
cannot alone yield conflict sufficient to significantly impede integration of
the theories.
The very process of looking for any differences between prevailing and
evolutionary theories (either in their theoretical substructures or in their
predictions) that might sufficiently conflict to impede integration will often
reveal a number of areas of overlap and underlying similarity that will
contribute toward the process of actually integrating prevailing and
evolutionary theories, to which we now turn.
B.

Toward an Integrated Model

Once the differences have been identified, and the conflicts isolated, the
integrative process brings the working surfaces of prevailing and
evolutionary theories slowly toward each other, to see whether they can
dovetail. A difference between them in their levels of analysis not only
does not make their conceptual surfaces incompatible, but it in fact
increases the likelihood that they will fit, since proximate causes and
ultimate causes, in the abstract, are as compatible as two sides of a coin.
Differences between the basic assumptions of the theories attributable to
exclusionary bias, rather than necessity, may be ignored altogether. And
differences between basic assumptions that do necessarily conflict may
lead us to conflicting predictions that are akin to incompatible projections
from the surfaces of the prevailing and evolutionary theories, respectively,
keeping their surfaces separated.
In the latter circumstance, further integrative efforts must await studies
carefully designed to test the predictions of the respective theories. One
or the other may appear preferable if its predictions are more consistent
with observable patterns of behavior or if it achieves the other's predictive
power with fewer or otherwise simpler assumptions. Nonetheless, no
weakness in a prevailing or evolutionary theory should suggest that
analysis at its level, proximate or ultimate, should be abandoned. All
human behavior plays against a backdrop of evolved human psychology,
and human psychology affects human behavior only through proximate
mechanisms.
Where evolutionary and prevailing theories do not conflict, one should
attempt to combine their constituent knowledge systems into a seamless,
integrated whole. This involves working to connect the major common
features-typically by linking the proximate influences identified by the
prevailing theories to the predictions of the evolutionary theories. That is:
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by demonstrating how an analysis that begins from the premise that
humans share an evolved psychology can lead to the prediction that
environmental factors (such as those identified by research under the
auspices of prevailing theories) will be positively correlated with the
behavior under study. To put it another way, one can connect common
features of the theories by tracing the logic by which human information
processing mechanisms (that will have evolved to incline individuals to
process information in a way tending to produce behavior that would have
been adaptive on average in an ancestral environment of evolutionary
adaptation) will have evolved to be sensitive to certain kinds of environmental variables (some of which may have been described as somehow
relevant by the prevailing theories).
To demonstrate more concretely, let's revisit the current state of affairs
in more detail. Widespread child abuse has fostered widespread public
concern about child abuse. Independently, the dramatically increasing
proportion of stepfamilies has dramatically increased public concern about
the troubles that members of stepfamilies experience-particularly
stepparent-stepchild tensions. The overwhelming bulk of literature on each
of these concerns makes clear that they travel in almost entirely unrelated
orbits. About the only thing they appear to have in common is that the
law (though not in isolation, of course) is supposed to do something about
each one. The law is supposed to decrease child abuse, through interventions, punishments, and deterrents. And the law is supposed to help
clarify, institutionalize, and normalize the role of stepparents in society,61 so
that their experiences will not be inferior to those of genetic parents.
Because of specialization, however, current scholarship on child abuse
overwhelmingly ignores stepparents, and current scholarship on stepparents
overwhelmingly ignores child abuse.62 So legal systems not surprisingly
treat each subject in isolation. For example, the great preponderance of
social science studies and reporting procedures that today capture
information regarding a perpetrator's relationship to an abused child
simply collapse stepparents into the definition of parents, reflecting a
perhaps unexamined assumption that distinguishing between parents and

61. See generally MARGARET MAHONEY, STEPFAMILIES AND THE LAW (1994) and Margaret
Mahoney, Reformulating the Legal Definitionof the Stepparent-ChildRelationship, STEPFAMILIES: WHO

BENEFITS? WHO DoEs NOT?, supra note 55, at 191 (each surveying the inconsistent legal approaches
to stepparent rights and obligations in the United States); Mark A. Fine, Social Policy Pertaining to
Stepfamilies: Should Stepparents and Stepchildren Have the Option of Establishing a Legal
Relationship?, in STEPFAMILIES: WHO BENEFrrs? WHO DOES NOT?, supra note 55, at 197; Gilbert A.
Holmes, The Tie That Binds: The Constitutional Right of Children to Maintain Relationships with

Parent-Like Individuals, 53 MD. L. REv. 358, 410 (1994) (arguing the law should "grant[] parent-like
individuals greater consideration than the current jurisprudence affords"). See also Mary Ann Mason
& David W. Simon, The Ambiguous Stepparent: Federal Legislation in Search of a Model, 29 FAM.

L.Q. 445 (Fall 1995).
62. There are extremely important exceptions, of course. See, e.g., sources cited supra note 58.

[Vol. 8:167

Law and Biology
stepparents is irrelevant to the issue of child abuse.63 Following that
lead, the procedures of state Child Protective Services (CPS) agencies
(which are charged with investigating reports of child abuse, assessing the
need for intervention, and supervising remedial measures) are typically
unaffected by whether a reportedly abused child resides with genetic
parents or stepparents6 4

Similarly and seemingly independently, one of the most recent and
comprehensive scholarly works on stepparenting contains, for example, no
index listing for, or substantive discussion of, either "abuse" or "child
abuse." 65 And while that work reports that more than 350 articles on
various aspects of stepfamilies appeared in professional journals between
1987 and 1994, only one of those included in the 350 addressed abuse.6
(That one, in any event, focused solely on the issue of sexual abuse and
did not attempt an explanatory or theoretical analysis.) Consistent with
these omissions, the general trend in law and legal scholarship is to
expand rights and obligations of stepparents (in the context of support
obligations, for instance) with minimal, if any, consideration of the
possible effects of such policies on the incidence of child abuse.
The problem here is that law's policies about child abuse are informed
by a variety of principally socio-cultural, and thus exclusively proximate,
theories about the causes of child abuse. Meanwhile, law's policies about
stepfamilies are informed by a variety of principally socio-cultural, and
thus exclusively proximate, theories about the reasons why the stepparentstepchild relationship exhibits various adjustment difficulties. Despite
some promising headway, 67 neither the theories about child abuse nor the
63. For example, the 1996 report of the Bureau of Justice Statistics on Child Victimizers: Violent
Offenders and Their Victims, includes stepchildren in the definition of "Own Child" when describing
victim-offender relationships. Child Victimizers: Violent Offenders and Their Victims, BUREAU OF
JUSTICE STATS. 10 (1996). This leads to such undifferentiated conclusions as: "Nearly a third of those
serving time in State prisons for violence against children had victimized their own child or a
stepchild." Id. at iii (emphasis added). The U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, in a 1995
report on child abuse, defined "parent" as "the birth mother/father, adoptive mother/father, or stepmother/father of a child." U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUM. SERVS., NAT'L CTR. ON CHILD ABUSE AND
NEGLECT, CHILD MALTREATMENT 1993: REPORTS FROM THE STATES TO THE NATIONAL CENTER ON
CHILD ABUSE AND NEGLECT (1995). And when the Inter-Agency Council on Child Abuse and Neglect
(ICAN) published the Child Death Review Team Report for 1994, with extremely detailed data, it
nonetheless lumped genetic parents, stepparents, substitute parents, and other caretakers together.
INTER-AGENCY COUNCIL ON CHILD ABUSE AND NEGLECT (ICAN) CHILD DEATH REvIEw TEAM REPORT
FOR 1994. Indeed, the "Relationship of Perpetrators" Table made no distinction between mothers and
stepmothers; or fathers and stepfathers. Id. at Table 12.
64. MARGARET M. MAHONEY, supra note 61, at 192-93.
65. STEPPARENTING: ISSUES IN THEORY, RESEARCH, AND PRACTICE (Kay Pasley & Marilyn IhingerTallman eds. 1994) [hereinafter STEPPARENTING].
66. The work claims there were two such articles during this time period. One of these appears to
have been inadvertently misattributed. The other is M. Gordon & S.J. Creighton, Natal and Nonnatal
Fathersas Sexual Abusers in the United Kingdom: A Comparative Analysis, 50 J. MARRIAGE & FAM.
99 (1988). As nearly as I have been able to determine, none of the 23 authors contributing to
STEPPARENTING cites a single one of the dozens of articles that have been written about stepfamilies
from the perspective of evolutionary psychology. See STEPPARENTING, supra note 65.
67. See supra note 58; BIOSOCIAL DIMENSIONS, supra note 20.
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theories about stepfamilies are yet integrated with the state of knowledge
in evolutionary psychology and evolutionary biology. And thus neither of
them is integrated with the other. Indeed, one observer, commenting on
an effort by sociologist David Popenoe to bring stepfamily theory and
evolutionary theory together, noted:
[Tihere is still enough resistance to biosocial explanations among social
scientists to retard interdisciplinary communication and cooperation and
to impede the needed integration of biological and social-environmental
perspectives on human behavior and institutions. For instance, a
sociologist who tenders a biological explanation for phenomena for
which there are popular social and cultural explanations still risks
damage to his or her reputation and virtual ostracism by some factions
in the discipline.6"
It is, in part, as a by-product of this resistance that law continues to
consider child abuse and stepfamily problems as unrelated phenomena.
Nevertheless, evolutionary analysis reveals that the seemingly separate
orbits of child abuse and stepfamily theories can be encompassed within
the larger orbit of evolutionary theories. More specifically, evolutionary
analysis provides us with theories of ultimate causation, in this case DPS,
which enable us to create an integrated model of child abuse and an
integrated model of stepfamily tensions. In turn, these integrated models
fit into a larger, more cohesive model of human behavior, that makes their
more subtle interrelationships clear.
The purpose of integration, from law's perspective, is to construct a
generally superior theory and model of the behavior law is charged with
addressing. A model that unifies existing knowledge, that is historically
accurate, and that uses a basic understanding of evolved psychology to
bridge the distance between the subjects evolutionary biologists study and
the subjects sociologists, economists, and historians study. One of the
most significant features of this integrated model, and one easily missed
by lawyers, as well as by those who already acknowledge certain genetic
influences on behavior, is that it emphasizes genetic similarity between
individuals over genetic differences. That is, an integrated model is
predicated on the premise that the overwhelming bulk of human information processing traits are shared in common among members of our
species. 69 The following sections demonstrate how the construction of
behavioral models that build on this premise can yield an integrated model

68. Norval D. Glenn, Biology, Evolutionary Theory, and Family Social Science, in STEPFAMILIES:
WHO BENEFrrs? WHO DOES NOT?, supra note 55, at 45, 50.
69. Some of these traits will vary, non-randomly of course, on either side of the line drawn by sex,
given 600 million years of sexual dimorphism. See RIDLEY, supra note 4; Kingsley R. Browne, Sex
and Temperament in Modem Society: A Darwinian View of the Glass Ceiling and the Gender Gap, 37
ARiz. L. 972, 973-1064 (1995) (surveying research on evolved sex differences).
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of child abuse, an integrated model of stepfamily tensions, and an
integrated behavioral model that combines the two.
1. An Integrated Model of Child Abuse
Upon examination, it is clear that the theoretical substructures of the
prevailing theories on child abuse do not conflict with those of the
evolutionary theory. Given the effectively exclusive emphasis they place
on the characteristics of abuser and abused, and on their respective lifetime
experiences of environmental, socio-cultural influences, the prevailing
theories on the causes of child abuse are paradigmatically theories that
identify proximate causes, while the DPS theory contributes an ultimate
cause analysis. And although the prevailing theories on child abuse appear
to share a basic (albeit perhaps unexamined) assumption that all relevant
causes are societal (and hence non-genetic) at the same time that the DPS
theory reflects the basic assumption that behavioral predicates to parenting
behavior can evolve, even in humans, this difference does not pose a true
conflict. For it is not in fact necessary to the logic of the prevailing
theories that behavior not be subject to evolutionary processes. Nor do the
predictions of the prevailing theories conflict with those of the DPS theory
in a fashion likely to impede integration. Examining two representative
predictions will make this clear.
First, the prevailing theories predict that a handicapped child will be at
a statistically greater risk of abuse than a non-handicapped child. Their
logic is that it is more difficult for parents to develop a strong social
attachment to the child, that it is more difficult for parents to raise a
handicapped child than a non-handicapped child, and that the stresses
these difficulties induce can result in abusive behavior. Second, the
prevailing theories predict that children in poor families will be at
somewhat greater risk of abuse. Their logic is that it is more difficult for
parents to raise children without steady access to adequate resources, and
that the stresses this difficulty induces can result in abusive behavior.
The theory of DPS makes the same two predictions, but for different
reasons. Handicapped children will be at increased risk because, in part,
human psychology has evolved to respond with affection and care to
infant gene vehicles in proportion to their probable eventual contribution
to parental reproductive success, as evident from observable cues of such
indicators as infant health. Because such cues are absent (or reduced) in
handicapped infants, these infants simply fail, on average, to evoke the
extraordinary psychological and emotional states that tended to prompt an
adult, at great immediate cost to self, to lavish resources upon another
organism. Neglect or abuse may follow. Children in poor families will
be at somewhat greater risk of abuse because human psychology has
evolved to make the qualitative and quantitative extent of parental care
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both condition-specific and infant-specific. Thus, where resources to raise
all dependent children to healthy independence are in short supply, young,
sickly, and/or supernumerary children are most likely to have their
proportional share of resources redirected toward other existing or future
offspring. Natural selection rewards heritable psychological predispositions that tend to yield behavior that tends toward optimizing inclusive
fitness returns on parental investment.
To integrate these two ideas, one need recognize that the DPS theory is
not an alternative to the prevailing theories. In fact it completes them and
gives them explanatory sense. While prevailing theories simply assume
without explanation that certain environmental stimuli will be stressful,
because we all empathically understand that they would be, understanding
how discriminative parental solicitude became a prominent component of
a species-typical, evolved, human psychology affords an understanding of
why parents are likely to experience handicaps and poverty as stressful,
and why such stresses are more likely to result in neglectful or injurious
behavior to given children than in any of the myriad alternative stressresponsive behaviors.70 DPS not only explains why people are likely to
find handicapped children or supernumerary children less appealing, but
it also draws a logical connection-in a way prevailing theories alone
cannot-between the stresses thereby induced and the abusive behavior
itself. In the environment in which the brain and the behavioral predispositions of nearly every species manifesting parental care evolved,
discriminative parental solicitude yielded greater reproductive success on
average than did indiscriminate parental solicitude. DPS consequently
spread in such species to larger and larger proportions of every successive
generation until it became thoroughly species-typical. Even in humans,
therefore, who introduce an unprecedented quantum of analytic reasoning
into their behavioral repertoires, DPS can be expected, on the margin, to
manifest itself in behaviors that reflect the logic of adaptation: Don't
squander parental resources on poor investments if the same investment
would probably yield higher returns elsewhere.
Depending on how you look at it, evolved DPS, undoubtedly one of the
least controversial psychological mechanisms in all of evolutionary
biology, provides either a missing piece of the explanatory puzzle, or an
overarching framework that enables patterns of child abuse in humans, as
well as patterns of juvenile harm in other animals, to make sense. Sense
not only within the context of abuse, but sense within the whole universe
of animal behavior.
An integrated, blended, holistic understanding of child abuse would
therefore categorize some abusive behavior within the larger context of
70. The study of child abuse, to date, can be generally characterized as a search for "marker
variables associated with abuse," while little work has in fact focused on theoretical frameworks to
explain the associations. A Continuum of Violence?, supra note 23 (emphasis added).
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child-rearing behavior, child-rearing behavior within the larger context of
reproductive strategies, and reproductive strategies within the larger
context of evolutionary processes, including natural selection. Taking it
from the top, natural selection rewarded with persistence through time
those traits that contributed toward their own replication. These, mixed
in varying combinations, yielded genetically-influenced patterns of
morphology and behavioral predispositions constituting reproductive
strategies, the distinctions between which mark the boundaries of what we
now call species. Child-rearing is but one element of the reproductive
strategy typical of our own primate species. And an accompanying,
evolved, animal psychology that would correlate subjective emotional and
motivational states with behavior tending to optimize inclusive fitness
returns on parental investment would be more adaptive than one indifferent to indicia of probable returns.
Thus, human parental behavior (in its default position-which can of
course be affected by other environmental and genetic influences) is not
reflexively evoked by simply any human child, but rather is subtly
contingent on particular, infant-specific, context-specific environmental
cues. And that contingency follows an adaptive logic that makes sense in
light of natural selection, to bias parental investment toward kin and,
among kin, according to cues that were predictive of inclusive fitness
returns in ancestral human environments. 1 DPS is therefore powerfully
likely to contribute to the emergence, from the collected behaviors of
many individuals, of not only non-random patterns of large and small
investments of parental resources but also of patterns that can be organized
around precisely the demographic and context-specific variables on which
natural selection would exert the most pressure.
2.

An Integrated Model of Stepfamily Tensions

The "special problems" of "reconstituted families," such as stepfamilies,
were noted by psychologists and sociologists in the 1920s and 1930s.72
Between then and now, hundreds of researchers have diligently documented how stepfamilies are subject to greater amounts of "stress, ambivalence,
and low cohesiveness" than the average family.73 The vast bulk of these

71. Margo Wilson & Martin Daly, The Psychology of Parenting in Evolutionary Perspective and
the Case of Human Filicide, in INFANTICIDE & PARENTAL CARE, supra note 24, at 73, 74.
72.

See LUCILE DUBERMAN, THE RECONSTITUTED FAMILY: A STUDY OF REMARRIED COUPLES AND

THEIR CHILDREN 1-3 (1975) (discussing briefly the early scholarship on stepfamilies).
73. DUBERMAN, supra note 72, at 2, citing, for example, Charles E. Bowerman & Donald P. Irish,
Some Relationships of Stepchildren to Their Parents, in MARRIAGE AND FAMILY IN THE MODERN
WORLD 580 (Ruth S. Cavan ed., 1969).
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studies are atheoretical.7 4 But it has been customary, since the 1970s, to
attribute these greater stresses to the "need for time to assume new
roles."75 Participants in the reconstituted family, it is argued, "have not
been step-family members before and are generally unsure of themselves
in their new statuses ...

and are not quite sure themselves what is

required of them."76 Stepparents and stepchildren lack extra-familial
institutionalized social norms, from "language, the law, and custom," that
would tell each how to behave.77 Consequently, stepfamily researchers
have reported that one of their most important "assumptions ...

about

reconstituted families," an assumption that provides a starting point for
additional research, is that:
The most detrimental factors in the reciprocal relationship of the
stepparent and the stepchild are hostility, competition, and jealousy, all
of which arisefrom feelings of insecurity and role confusion on the part
of each, and originat[e]in ... the society.78

Such a bold, proud assumption, of course, simply echoes the standard
social science model of human behavior, in which all relevant influences
on behavior "originate" in society.
Upon examination, it is clear that the theoretical substructures of this
social science model do not conflict with those of evolutionary theory.
Given the effectively exclusive emphasis that "role theory" places on the
individual experiences of the stepfamily members, within a culture that
treats stepfamilies in particular ways, the prevailing theory on the causes

74. Kay Pasley & Marilyn Ihinger-Tallman, The Evolution of a Field of Investigation: Issues and
Concerns, in REMARRIAGE AND STEPPARENTING 303, 305 (Kay Pasley & Marilyn Thinger-Tallman eds.,
1987) [hereinafter REMARRIAGE AND STEPPARENTING] ("For the most part studies of remarriage and
stepparenting are atheoretical."). Researchers surveying recent stepfamily scholarship, for example,
concluded that barely 12% of the works made explicit reference to any theory that might explain their
findings. Kay Pasley et al., Remarriage and Stepfamilies: Making Progress in Understanding, in
STEPPARENTING, supra note 65, at 1, 10.
75. DUBERMAN, supra note 72, at 5-6. See also, Jean Giles-Sims, The Stepparent Role:
Expectations, Behavior and Sanctions, 5 J. FAM. IssUEs 116 (1984); Kay Pasley, Family Boundary
Ambiguity: Perceptionsof Adult Stepfamily Members, in REMARRIAGE AND STEPPARENTING, supra note
74 at 73, 74; Bray et al., Role Integration and Marital Adjustment in Stepfather Families, in
STEPPARENTING, supra note 65, at 69, 69 ("Given the general lack of socially and legally prescribed
roles for stepparents, this task (of bringing a stepparent into a new "family system"] is often fraught
with stress and uncertainty."). For an elaboration of "systems theory," that focuses on loosely defined
or ambiguous intra-family boundaries, see Jean Giles-Sims, Comparison of Implications of the Justice
and Care Perspectivesfor Theories of Remarriageand Stepparenting, in STEPPARENTING, supra note
65, at 33, 37.
76. DUBERMAN, supra note 72, at 5-6.
77. See, e.g., Andrew Cherlin, Remarriageas an Incomplete Institution, 84 AM. J. SOCIOL. 634, 646
(1978).
78. DUBERMAN, supra note 72, at 7-8. (emphasis added). Margaret Mead's theory for the finding
that step-relations are not satisfactory: "Each American child learns early and in terror that his whole
security depends on that single set of parents .... We have never made adequate social provision for
the security and identity of the children if that marriage is broken." Anomalies in American Postdivorce
Relationship, in DIVORCE AND AFrER 102 (Paul Bohannan ed., 1970).
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of stepfamily tension is paradigmatically a theory that identifies proximate
causes, whereas the DPS theory contributes an ultimate causation analysis.
Despite their different orientations, however, "role theory" and DPS theory
operate at completely different levels of analysis, proximate and ultimate
respectively. This distinction creates no obstacle to integration. And
while role theory's basic assumption that all relevant causes are societal
(and hence non-genetic) appears to conflict with the DPS theory's basic
assumption that behavioral predispositions toward unrelated but dependent
juveniles can evolve (and are therefore necessarily influenced by gene
combinations) such a conflict is a false one-the product of the
exclusionary bias of the standard social science model, not of exclusionary
necessity.
Yet unlike the predictions of prevailing and evolutionary theories of
child abuse, which are quite similar in relevant respects, predictions of role
theory and DPS theory occasionally conflict. For example, role theory
implicitly predicts that if one were to examine the historical record, one
would discover that stepparenthood in modem times is a novel social role.
Otherwise it would be institutionalized by now. Evolutionary theory
instead predicts that substitute parents would tend to be present in the
historical record quite frequently-whenever for both a particular male and
female the long-term potential to increase reproductive success by a union,
even with someone who has a dependent child, was greater than that
probably resulting from an alternative mating strategy (such as singleparenting or, perhaps, involuntary abstinence). The latter prediction far
more closely fits the facts of the historical record.7 9 Across human
history, substitute parents have been common. And whereas role theory
predicts that stepparent-stepchild relations would become less problematic
as increasing numbers of stepfamilies generate and institutionalize
standards of conduct,80 DPS theory predicts that step relationships will
be more conflictual in all human societies, regardless of their prevalence
or rarity, and hence regardless of their "institutionalization." Again, the
latter prediction more closely fits the facts.8"
Despite this analysis, however, which only begins to whittle away some
of the incompatible projections from the strong version of role theory,
there are still sufficient compatibilities between the prevailing social
science theories on stepparent tensions and evolutionary theory to enable
useful integration. For example, the fact that role theory does not
adequately explain why stepfamilies are more stressful does not negate the

79. Martin Daly & Margo Wilson, Stepparenthood and the Evolved Psychology of Discriminative
Parental Solicitude, in INFANTICIDE & PARENTAL CARE, supra note 24, at 121, 127 [hereinafter
Stepparenthood].
80. See, e.g., Jean Giles-Sims, The Stepparent Role: Expectations, Behavior,and Sanctions, 5 J. OF
FAM. IssuEs 116, 127 (March 1984).
81. Stepparenthood,supra note 79.
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social science theory predictions (based, somewhat tautologically, on
findings to the same effect) that stepfamilies will be more stressful than
families composed only of children genetically related (or at least

subjectively believed to be genetically related) to both parents. This is
entirely consistent with what DPS predicts. Moreover, DPS provides a

parsimonious explanation for why studies show that stepparents are less
likely to feel love for stepchildren, less likely to feel the same loyalty to
stepchildren that they feel for their own children, and more likely to find
the presence of stepchildren stressful.82 That is (and this refrain should

sound familiar) the process of natural selection will have penalized, over
time, any behavioral predisposition to treat kin and non-kin identically.

Similarly, it will have rewarded, over time, predispositions to psychological states tending to direct finite parental resources toward kin. (This
means only that, whatever the incidence of abuse, stepparents will be over

represented, however incrementally, among abusers; it does not mean that
most stepparents will abuse.13)
Consequently, an integrated, blended, holistic understanding of
stepfamily dynamics would therefore categorize a stepfamily union within

the larger context of mating behavior (as one in which the rearing of an
unrelated child is but a cost of receiving the benefit of exclusive access to

the child's parent). It would then place mating behavior within the larger
context of reproductive strategies, and reproductive strategies within the
larger context of evolutionary processes, including natural selection. And,
as above, natural selection rewarded with persistence through time those
traits that contributed toward their own replication.

These, mixed in

82. From the vast literature on dissatisfactions of stepfamily life, see Terry F. Perkins & James P.
Kahan, An Empirical Comparison of Natural-fatherand Stepfather Family Systems, 18 FAm. PROCESS
175 (1979); J.W. Santrock & K.A. Sitterle, Parent-Child Relationships in Stepmother Families, in
REMARRIAGE AND STEPPARENTING, supra note 74, at 73,74; Lynn K. White & Alan Booth, The Quality
and Stability of Remarriages: The Role of Stepchildren, 50 Am. SOCIOL. REv. 689 (1985); E. FERR,
STEPCHILDREN: A NATIONAL STUDY (1984); J.Z. Anderson, and G.D. White, An EmpiricalInvestigation
of Interaction and Relationship Patternsin Functional and Dysfunctional Nuclear and Stepfamilies, 25
FAm. PROCESS 407 (1986).
Stepparents do not generally feel the same child-specific love and
commitment as genetic parents, nor do they perceive the same emotional rewards from their parental
investment. See discussion in Martin Daly & Margo Wilson, Risk of Maltreatment of Children Living
With Stepparents, in BIOsOCIAL DtMENSIoNs, supra note 20. Researchers have found that only 53%
of stepfathers and only 25% of stepmothers claimed "parental feeling" toward their stepchildren and
even fewer claimed to "love" them and that both marital partners in step-families indicate they are
looking forward to the children's departure, and stepchildren do in fact leave home at an earlier age
than those living with natural parents. DUBERMAN, supra note 72; J.H. Rankin, The Family Context of
Delinquency, 30 SOC. PROBS. 466 (1983).
83. Note that whether or not a behavior is currently adaptive is irrelevant to whether or not that
behavior can properly be considered to have evolved. Human psychology adapted to ancient
environments, not modem ones. See, e.g., Sarah Blaffer Hrdy, Assumptions and Evidence Regarding
the Sexual Selection Hypothesis: A Reply to Boggess, in INFANTICIDE: COMPARATIVE AND EVOLUTIONARY PERSPECTIVES, supra note 24, at 315. Confusion about this has, unfortunately, lead some to
misunderstand (at least initially) arguments grounded in ultimate causation. See, e.g., Sarah Lenington,
Child Abuse: The Limits of Sociobiology, 2 ETHOL. & SOCIOBIOL. 17, 26 (1981) ("it ... would be
extraordinarily difficult to show that individuals who abuse their children are, in fact, increasing their
reproductive success.").
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infinite combination, yielded genetically-influenced patterns of morphology
and behavioral predispositions that constituted reproductive strategies, the
distinctions between which mark the boundaries of what we now call
species. Procuring a mate is but one element of the reproductive strategy
typical of sexually reproducing species. And an accompanying, evolved,
animal psychology that would correlate subjective emotional and
motivational states with behavior tending to optimize inclusive fitness
returns on parental investment would be more adaptive than one indifferent to indicia of probable returns.
Thus, human mating behavior, while expected in the aggregate to shy
from responsibility for unrelated children, may also be expected to
evidence a condition-dependent willingness to accept such responsibility
in circumstances that, during the environment of evolutionary adaptation,
would have suggested that the probable benefits to reproductive success
of such a union would outweigh the costs of investing resources in
another's child. At the same time, the adaptive logic of favoring kin over
non-kin is expected to result in more stepfamily "tensions" (if such are
defined in part, as they implicitly are in much of the social science
research, as those emotional and logistical frictions that stem from the lack
of the affectional psychology and behavior typical to families in which
both parents are equally related to every child). This is because a child
that does not exhibit cues long associated with relatedness is less likely to
evoke, in the stepparent, the psychological state of parental solicitude.
Again, then, an evolved, species-wide, psychological mechanism
predisposing humans to allocate their finite and precious parental resources
to other individuals in ways that discriminate in favor of those most likely
to contribute to parental reproductive success, enables patterns of tension
between stepparents and their stepchildren to make sense.
3.

Integrating Models of Child Abuse and Stepfamily Tensions

One principal benefit of integrating behavioral models for particular
behaviors is that integrated models of differing behaviors are themselves
often easily integrated. Theories of ultimate causation extend horizontally
to link behaviors historically separated vertically. Once the models of
child abuse and stepfamily tensions have each been integrated, to reflect
both proximate and ultimate causation, for example, it is a relatively
simple matter to integrate each with the other.
Viewed only at the level of proximate causation, patterns of child abuse
and of stepfamily tensions seem entirely unrelated.
Socio-cultural
influences that social sciences have correlated with the one seem
categorically different from those associated with the other. Absent an
evolutionary analysis, there is little reason to suspect that the two have
much to do with one another. But in the light of evolutionary psychology,
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deep commonalities are revealed, suggesting that the two phenomena are
quite closely related. They both appear to trace, at least in part, to the
same evolved, species-typical behavioral propensity: discriminative
parental solicitude. That is, a single aspect of evolved human psychology
can reconcile the demographic patterns of children most likely to be
abused with the patterns of tensions and conflict within stepparentstepchild dyads.
The elegance that the evolutionary perspective affords integrated
behavioral models is that it provides a broad, thematic coherence that in
many ways provides at a meta-level the same attention to complex
dynamic interactions that "systems theory" of the social sciences reflects.
That is, analysis at the level of ultimate causation provides an overarching
"system" to systems-a recognizable, predictable, and understandable
super-pattern to the discrete, isolated, and often unintegrated local patterns,
the boundaries of which today reflect somewhat arbitrary disciplinary
divisions.
An integrated behavioral model, which puts many of the proximate
causes from the standard social science models within the framework of
the ultimate causation that evolutionary theories afford, enables us to see
reciprocal connections between child abuse and stepparentage, and
between these and other important aspects of human behavior. And once
the family is seen as epiphenomenal to a psychology evolved to predispose
humans toward reproductive success, the alliances between mates, and
between adults and juveniles, seem more tenuous than commonly
supposed-more the product of interests that necessarily overlap and
diverge than of interests that are identical in all particulars. We can see
that patterns in both the neglect, maltreatment, and abuse of children, on
the one hand, and the love of them and devotion of extraordinary
resources to them, on the other, derive from the same source. The
dynamics of child abuse and stepfamily tensions can then be viewed as
one end of a continuum of intra-familial behaviors, all of which will, all
else being equal, tend to reflect the logic of adaptation, which in turn
reflects the natural selection pressures that existed in our ancestors'
times-long before our ability to create environments that increasingly
diverged from those to which our minds and bodies were adapted.
In this sense, exposing the logical link between child abuse patterns and
stepfamily tensions is simply one of many successive linkages, each of
which pulls toward one integrated whole several already accumulating
masses of behaviors and data. Once, for example, child abuse and
stepfamily tensions are conceptually joined by the recognition that each
incorporates an evolved discriminative parental solicitude, they continue
together in a series of behavioral affiliations that makes them cousins to
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such likewise linked things as patterns in sex preferences for offspring8
and patterns in preferred number of offspring.?" These all, in turn, can
then be seen as related to predictable patterns in parent-offspring
conflict8 6 (including maternal-fetal conflict 8 ); patterns in sexual, courtship, and mating behavior; 88 patterns in parental manipulation of
offsvring's behavior;89 patterns in marriage/divorce/remarriage demographics; patterns in sexual jealousy; 9' patterns in domestic and other
violence; 92 patterns in risk-taking behavior; 93 patterns in cooperation and
conflict; 94 and the like.

What this process demonstrates is that by building in The Integration
Stage of evolutionary analysis upon the structured foundation provided by

84. See Robert Trivers & Dan Willard, Natural Selection of ParentalAbility to Vary the Sex Ratio
of Offspring, 179 SCIENCE 90 (1973); Owen D. Jones, Reproductive Autonomy and Evolutionary
Biology: A Regulatory Frameworkfor Trait-Selection Technologies, 19 AM. J.L. & MED. 187 (1993)
(surveying, in part, evidence regarding the Trivers-Willard hypothesis).
85. See, e.g., Guy Beauchamp, The FunctionalAnalysis of Human FertilityDecisions, 15 ETHOL.
& SOClOBIOL. 31 (1994).
86. See, e.g., Daly, supra note 30; Martin Daly & Margo Wilson, Is Parent-OffspringConflict SexLinked? Freudian and Darwinian Models, 58 J. PERSONALITY 163 (March 1990).
87. See, e.g, David Haig, Genetic Conflicts in Human Pregnancy, 68 Q. REv. BI. 495 (1993).
88. See, e.g, HUMAN REPRODUCTIVE BEHAVIOUR: A DARWINIAN PERSPECTIVE (Laura Betzig et al.
eds., 1988); DAVID Buss, THE EVOLUTION OF DESIRE: STRATEGIES OF HUMAN MATING (1994)
[hereinafter THE EVOLUTION OF DESIRE]; David M. Buss & David P. Schmitt, Sexual Strategies Theory:
An Evolutionary Perspective on Human Mating, 100 PSYCH. REV. 204 (1993); David M. Buss, Sex
Differences in Human Mate Preferences: Evolutionary Hypotheses Tested in 37 Cultures, 12 BEHAV.
& BRAIN Sc. 1 (1989); GOLDSMITH, supra note 9, at 60-67; ROBERT WRIGHT, THE MORAL ANIMAL:
EVOLUTIONARY PSYCHOLOGY AND EVERYDAY LIFE 55-107 (1994); Linda R. Hirsch & Luci Paul,
Human Male Mating Strategies: . Courtship Tactics of the "Quality" and "Quantity" Alternatives, 17
ETHOL. & SOCIOBIOL. 55 (1996); Luci Paul & Linda R. Hirsch, Human Male Mating Strategies: I1.
Moral Codes of "Quality" and "Quantity" Strategists, 17 ETHOL. & SOCIOBIOL. 71 (1996); John
Marshall Townsend et al., Low-Investment Copulation: Sex Differences in Motivations and Emotional
Reactions, 16 ETHOL. & SOCIOBIOL. 25 (1995).
89. See generally TRIVERS, supra note 43, at 145-165.
90. See, e.g., HELEN E. FISHER, ANATOMY OF LOVE: THE NATURAL HISTORY OF MONOGAMY,
ADULTERY, AND DIVORCE (1992).
91. See, e.g., THE EVOLUTION OF DESIRE, supra note 88; David M. Buss et al., Sex Differences in
Jealousy: Evolution, Physiology, and Psychology, 3 PSYCH. SCI. (July 1992); Martin Daly et al., Male
Sexual Jealousy 3 ETHOL. & SOCIOBIOL. 11 (1982).
92. See, e.g., HOMICIDE, supra note 25; Martin Daly & Margo Wilson, Evolutionary Psychology of
Male Violence, Explanations and Theoretical Perspectives, in MALE VIOLENCE 253 (John Archer ed.
1993); Evolutionary Social Psychology, supra note 25, at 519; Martin Daly & Margo Wilson,
Evolutionary Psychology and Family Violence, in SOCIOBIOLOGY AND PSYCHOLOGY: IDEAS, ISSUES AND
APPLICATIONS (Charles Crawford et al. eds., 1987); David M. Buss, From Vigilance to Violence, 9
ETHOL. & SOCIOBIOL. 291 (1988); Margo Wilson & Martin Daly, An Evolutionary Psychological
Perspective on Male Sexual Proprietarinessand Violence Against Wives, 8 VIOLENCE & VICTIMS 271
(1993); Martin Daly et al., Children Fatheredby Previous Partners:A Risk Factorfor Violence Against
Women, 84 CANAD. J. PUB. HEALTH 209 (1993); Russell P. Dobash et al., The Myth of Sexual Symmetry
in Marital Violence, 39 SOC. PROBS. 71 (Feb. 1992); Margo Wilson & Martin Daly, Spousal Homicide
Risk and Estrangement, 8 VIOLENCE & VICTIMs 3 (1993).
93. See, e.g., Margo Wilson & Martin Daly, Competitiveness, Risk Taking, and Violence: The Young
Male Syndrome, 6 ETHOL. & SOCIOBIOL. 59 (1985). See also Paul H. Rubin & Chris W. Paul, An
Evolutionary Model of Taste for Risk, 17 ECON. INQUIRY 585 (1979).
94. See, e.g., ROGER D. MASTERS, THE NATURE OF POLITICS (1989); ROBERT AXELROD, THE
EVOLUTION OF COOPERATION (1984); HOMICIDE, supra note 25; Martin Daly & Margo Wilson,
Homicide and Kinship, 84 AM. ANTHRO. 372 (1982).
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The Identification Stage (which framed the inquiry) and The Information

Stage (which explored evolutionary predicates for law-relevant behavior)
law can both pursue and achieve a more complete and richly
contextualized understanding of its human subject. That is, by identifying
salient differences and similarities between standard social science model
theories of proximate causation and evolutionary theories of ultimate
causation, law can inform itself of a model for human behavior that more
seamlessly interconnects, interweaves, and finally integrates previously
isolated systems of disciplinary knowledge.
IV.

IMPLICATIONS FOR LAW

My principal purpose has been to explore, in the foregoing parts, the
integrative component of one possible method for conducting evolutionary
analysis in law.9 And although I have elsewhere elaborated on the
relevance of such integration to the fourth, final, and most practical stage
of the analysis, The Application Stage,96 I would nonetheless be remiss
not to address briefly three probing questions that all the foregoing is
likely to provoke.
Precisely why does all this matter to law?
What difference does it make?
And why is this anything other than simply very interesting?
Together, and at their most challenging, these questions really ask: What
reason is there to believe that a more "integrated" model of human
behavior necessarily translates into any concrete benefit to the legal
system? The answers, each of which I believe to be independent and
sufficient justification, are several.
First, and foremost, there are benefits to disciplinary integrity. All else
being equal, accuracy is better than inaccuracy. And any behavioral
model that fails to locate human behavior against a backdrop of evolved
morphology, psychology, and behavior is inaccurate, regardless of whether
that failing makes a discernable difference in any particular legal context.
There may be good reason, on occasion, for a legal system to engage in
legal fictions. For largely administrative reasons, for example, the courts
will sometimes, quite knowingly, treat a legal issue as having been
previously raised and adjudicated, because it could have been raised and
adjudicated, even if it has not actually been raised and adjudicated. But
to engage in the fiction that all law-relevant behavior is socially constructed because of avoidable ignorance, or to knowingly engage in such a

95. See Appendix.
96. See Jones, supra note 16, Part II.D
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fiction without an affirmative and justifiable decision to do so, is
irresponsible.
Second, there are usually benefits to seeing the big picture, even when
these are unquantifiable. Although it is not always possible to easily
sketch the advantage that an integrated model of human behavior affords,
it is rare that seeing only the small picture, rather than the big, makes one
more effective at pursuing one's own purpose. Though the benefits of
seeing the big picture are not susceptible of pithy description, they are
nonetheless important and worthy of serious attention-perhaps even more
so for the ease with which they can be overlooked. And those benefits
will undoubtedly parallel, for our balkanized conception of human
behavior, the benefits of treating a tree-like leg, a snake-like trunk, a ropelike tail, and a wall-like torso as an elephant, rather than as individual
parts groped by blind men.
The importance of the accuracy of the behavioral model increases
proportionally to the importance of the change law is trying to effect in
human behavior. It makes no difference whether you have a flat-Earth or
round-Earth model of the universe so long as all you want to do is plant
crops. But it makes a big difference if you want to move ships between
continents, or put men on the moon. Similarly, whether one has a simple,
standard social science model for the causes of child abuse or a model that
integrates sociology, psychology, and biology, makes little difference if all
you want to do is throw a broad, general policy program at the phenomenon. Through careful observation, the traditional approaches of the social
sciences can identify a number of proximate factors, the reduction of
which can contribute to the success of general policies. But it makes a big
difference which model you employ if you want to launch a sustained and
aggressive campaign against child abuse that squeezes the most efficient
return, in terms of decreased abuse, from the same, finite investment of
social and legal resources. That is, an integrated model can help to target
those resources more narrowly at the segments of the population (like
stepparents) most likely to abuse children, and toward reducing the
prevalence of those environmental factors (such as poverty and other
social stressors) most likely to contribute toward the incidence of that
behavior.
Third, and more specifically, there are benefits from integration to our
efforts to locate proximate causes of behavior and estimate the relative
importance of each. Integration leads us to expect that natural selection
will have left humans today with behavioral predispositions that tended to
increase individual inclusive fitness in ancestral times. By means of this
insight, and some general facility in the patterns by which inclusive fitness
can be increased and decreased, we can confidently predict the major
contours of behavioral patterns likely to emerge in modem society. Prior
to the arguments of evolutionary theorists, for example, which were based
on an integrated model of human behavior, no scholars seemed prepared
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to state, justify, or pursue a prediction that stepchildren would be at a far
higher risk of child abuse and homicide than would other children.
Instead, scholars considered the perception of that risk groundless, and
indeed today the risk continues to be ignored by entire industries of
scholarship. An integrated model of human behavior, however, predicts
this risk independent of any prior perceptions or data.
Fourth, there are advantages from integration to our ability to identify
and evaluate the respective costs and benefits of simultaneously pursuing
different legal goals. Because an integrated perspective is more likely than
an unintegrated one to establish connections between seemingly disparate
forms of behavior, it is also more likely to uncover connections that trade
the successful pursuit of one goal against the successful pursuit of another.
Such hidden conflicts, left undiscovered, undercut the overall effectiveness
of a legal regime, as surely as efforts to drain a pool at one end and to fill
it at the other. For example, an integrated model says nothing about
whether law should somehow target stepparents as part of a larger effort
to reduce child abuse, or whether law should expand legal rights of
stepparents in an effort to destigmatize them. But an integrated model
does make clear, for the first time, that these two goals are necessarily in
conflict. That is, either one cost of reducing child abuse is the stigmatization of stepparents, or the cost of not stigmatizing stepparents is some
number of otherwise preventable child abuse incidents (even infanticides).
Consequently, evolutionary analysis can starkly reveal significant
subsurface tensions between policies that previously seemed to peacefully
coexist. By doing so, it can increase the comprehensiveness of the costbenefit evaluations that help society select and prioritize legal goals.
Fifth, integration can provide theory to buttress wobbly belief. Models
matter. And the lack of a good one can sink an otherwise sound legal
policy. So even in those cases in which conceptual integration does
nothing more than provide an explanation for an already perceived causal
connection, it will have done plenty. For we are often hesitant to
construct a legal policy on the foundation of observations that lack
explanations. For good reason, we suspect the presence of complicating
confounds, and doubt the wisdom of a policy built only on perceived
connections, and nothing more. For example, even in the presence of an
antecedent belief that children are at greater risk of abuse in a home with
a stepparent than in one without, we might hesitate to act. And even in
the presence of data indicating that that belief was largely accurate, we
may still hesitate, thinking that such a correlation may be attributable to
as yet unidentified and more palatable phenomena having nothing to do
with stepparent status. In such circumstances, we implicitly await
improvements in behavioral models, such as that which conceptual
integration can provide.
All in all, an integrated model provides a number of immediate and less
immediate advantages to law. It facilitates a sensitivity to species-typical
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behavioral rhythms, desires, and abilities. Because it is probabilistic, not
deterministic, evolutionary analysis can help us better to understand human
behavior by illuminating its historical context, by highlighting its dynamic
processes, by providing insights into its origins, and by suggesting
circumstances that are more likely to evoke certain behavioral responses
than others. That is, it increases behavioral predictability and decreases
the number of behaviors that will be dismissed as novel and unanticipated,
or aberrational, random, and unconnected.
If we are serious about our collective assertions that laws should further
our democratically-fashioned goals and social order, then we should not
only welcome, but aggressively pursue, the contributions evolutionary
analysis can supply to the formulation of sophisticated legal policies. For
it will increase law's ability to pursue whatever democratically-percolated
goals it undertakes by integrating the behavioral model on which it relies
It will
with continuing advances in other behavioral disciplines.
ultimately provide a more solid fulcrum. And a more solid fulcrum will
improve law's ability to shift patterns in human behavior.
CONCLUSION

Every legal system has, as its fulcrum, a behavioral model that purports
to explain observable patterns of human activity. The law can obtain no
more leverage on human behavior than the solidity of that behavioral
model allows.
At present, however, most of us directly involved with shaping and
applying the legal system, such as legal policymakers, legal
decisionmakers, lawyers, and legal academics, seem unaware even that we
have a model. Let alone what that model might be. This would continue
to be untroubling, as it has been for so long, but for the fact that our
model is now certainly obsolete. When we dust it off we discover that it
often operates on the unstated assumption that law-relevant behavior flows
from a magical mind-loosed from its own evolutionary history and
shaped almost exclusively by learning, culture, and experiences. That is,
we still, even if more from unconscious habit than from decision, often
subscribe to the pre-Darwinian myths that Homo sapiens sapiens differs
from other animals in kind, not just in degree, and that the influence of
human mind on behavior means that all human behavior comes from
mind-socially constructed by the summed experiences an individual
encounters in a single lifetime. Modem behavioral science has punctured
these myths, exposing the social constructivist behavioral model as
importantly incomplete. And therefore, to the precise extent that law
depends almost exclusively upon it, law will remain, like its model,
seriously flawed. A flawed model imports in this context what it imports
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in every other: that all efforts based upon it are less likely to be successful
than would be efforts based on a less flawed model.
Law, instead, should be leveraging against an integrated model of
human behavior. One that, far from over-simplifying human behavior,
reflects the most complete understanding available of the multiple and
complex influences on behavior. One that is more richly nuanced,
incorporating the most rigorously tested developments of the behavioral
sciences with the most careful empirical observations of the social
sciences. And one that better vindicates, more fully than prevailing,
unsupplemented, social constructivist models can alone, our species'
unique history, consciousness, capabilities, and richly complex behavioral
processes.
This, in turn, requires that we in law cease being passive recipients of
almost exclusively standard social science models of behavior and begin
to participate actively in interdisciplinary, integrative processes. It requires
that we get comfortable with the simultaneity of proximate and ultimate
causes-that we recognize that humans share internal, information
processing characteristics that are distinctly human, just as we have more
observable external characteristics that are distinctly human. It requires
that we anticipate that evolved human psychology will reflect the logic of
adaptation, and that it will predispose us, on average, toward behavior that
was adaptive in that ancient environments in which most of our physical
and neural architectures were shaped. Finally, it requires that we regularly
undertake evolutionary analyses, such as that herein described, to actively
assist in the creation of behavioral models superior to those on which
current legal thinkers and policy-makers so often rely.
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APPENDIX

EVOLUTIONARY ANALYSIS IN LAW: A MODEL
I. The Identification Stage: On Purpose and Process
A. What is The Legal Goal?
B. Will Evolutionary Analysis Further Pursuit of That Goal?
1. What Are The Prevailing Theories?
2. Is the Failure to Achieve the Goal Solely Attributable to
Inadequate Implementation of Adequate Theories?
3. Are the Prevailing Theories Already Informed by the Influence
of Natural Selection on Behavior?
4. How Greatly Might the Behavior in Question Have Affected
the Reproductive Success of Our Ancestors?
II. The
A.
B.
C.
D.
E.

Information Stage: On Theories and Evidence
What Are the Relevant Evolutionary Theories and Predictions?
What Empirical Evidence Bears on Those Predictions?
How Does the Evidence Fit the Predictions?
Do the Theories Apply to Humans?
Should the Theories Be Considered in Legal Analysis and PolicyMaking?

III. The Integration Stage: On Conflicts and Compatibilities
A. Where Do Prevailing and Evolutionary Theories Conflict?
1. Conflicts Between Theoretical Substructures
a) Levels of Analysis
b) Basic Assumptions
2. Conflicts Between Predictions
B. How May Non-Conflicting Elements Be Integrated?
IV The Application Stage: On Utility
A. How Can Evolutionary Analysis Help to Refine Behavioral
Models?
1. Emphasizing Both Proximate and Ultimate Causation
2. Revealing New Associated Environmental Factors ("AEFs")
3. Restating Prior AEFs More Precisely
4. Predicting Interactions of AEFs
B. How Can Evolutionary Analysis Help to Generate New Legal
Strategies?
1. New Strategies for Newly Identified AEFs
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C.

D.

How Can Evolutionary Analysis Help to Improve Cost-Benefit
Analyses?
1. Identifying Policy Conflicts
2. Clarifying Costs of Conflicts
How Can Evolutionary Analysis Help to Reveal Promising
Directions for Future Research?
1. New Ways to Collect and Slice Data
2. Further Study of Multiple Evolutionary Theories
3. Further Research to Test Conflicting Predictions

[Vol. 8:167

